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Preface
Over the past few years there has been a growing consensus among policy
makers that reforming the 61 year old welfare program—Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC)—is essential. The recent enactment of the Per
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996 is the outcome of
this widespread concern. The new law replaces AFDC, a federal entitlement
program, and its companion education, work, and training programs (JOBS)
with a system of block grants to states; and it gives the states considerably
more discretion over the design and operation of their programs than was the
case under the AFDC program. The goal of the legislation is to break the cycle
of dependency by both encouraging those already on welfare to find jobs and
by discouraging those not yet on welfare from coming on the program.
This monograph, Lessons for Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the AFDC
Caseload and Past Welfare-to-work Programs, provides policy makers with
research results relating to historical trends in the AFDC caseload, the per
sonal characteristics and patterns of welfare participation in a nationally repre
sentative sample of young women followed over a thirteen-year period, and an
evaluative survey of the effectiveness of past education, training, and workfare
programs in reducing the AFDC caseload. These research results should be
helpful to the states as they plan and begin the implementation of the new leg
islation. For example, how many recipients can be expected to become inde
pendent on their own before reaching the five-year time limit imposed by the
new legislation? And what are the characteristics and realistic labor market
options of those who still will be welfare-dependent at the five-year limit?
How helpful are work/training programs likely to be in reducing welfare
dependency? How will current and potential recipients react to a general
reduction in the financial benefits available from welfare? Will teenage out-ofwedlock childbearing fall along with a decline in the incidence of welfare par
ticipation among young women?
This project was commissioned in 1992 by the former National Commis
sion on Employment Policy (NCEP), and it was completed in 1994. The
research was conducted while the authors were at the Center for the Study of
Business and Government at Baruch College of the City University of New
York. June O'Neill, at the time, was director of the Center and Professor of
Economics and Finance at Baruch College. Since March 1995, she has been
on leave as director of the Congressional Budget Office. David O'Neill is cur
rently a senior research associate at the Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric
Research in Orangeburg, New York.

The project was originally designed to inform the potential implementation
of a welfare reform policy that included a time limit on benefits. As it turned
out, the new legislation features such a time limit. The report has been updated
to include a description of the new law.
The authors would like to thank Neil Zanc for comments on early stages of
the study, Carol Romero and Janet Johnston, also on the staff of the former
NCEP, for their detailed review and helpful comments on drafts of this report,
as well as an anonymous reviewer for the Upjohn Institute who provided valu
able advice. The authors gratefully acknowledge the expert programming and
research assistance of Wenhui Li.
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Lessons for Welfare Reform
An Analysis of the AFDC Caseload
and Past Welfare-to-work Programs

CHAPTER

1

Introduction
The growth of the U.S. welfare system has generated many con
cerns, but perhaps the major one is that welfare receipt can turn into
long-term welfare dependency with detrimental consequences for both
the adult recipients and their children. Although Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), our welfare program for six decades, has
functioned as a temporary helping hand for many families, a significant
minority of these families have remained on the program for many
years. Increasingly, the welfare caseload has been composed of women
who have borne their first child while unmarried teenagers. These
women are particularly vulnerable to becoming long-term welfare
recipients.
Prompted by these concerns and by mounting criticism of the AFDC
program, welfare reform became a prominent national issue. On
August 22, 1996, federal legislation was enacted that terminates AFDC
and replaces it with a new and significantly different program: the Per
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(H.R. 3734-PL 104-193). 1
The new law draws on many reform innovations that were recently
initiated at the state level. For more than a decade, an increasing num
ber of states have conducted demonstration experiments and intro
duced more permanent reforms under waivers granted by the federal
government. Those waivers have allowed states to implement changes
in their welfare programs that would not otherwise have been permit
ted under the legislation governing the AFDC program.
The .primary goal of the state initiatives has been to reduce depen
dency by promoting incentives to leave welfare or by discouraging
going on in the first place. However, the programmatic approach to
meeting this goal has shifted over time. The welfare reform efforts of
earlier years focused largely on the development of employment and

2

Introduction

training programs that aimed to increase the potential earnings of wel
fare recipients. More recent efforts, however, began to tackle, the other
side of the equation through initiatives that would make benefits less
generous and regulations more restrictive. Such initiatives have
included limits on the number of years a family could receive welfare
benefits and stricter work requirements for adults during periods of
welfare receipt.
The new welfare legislation shifts considerable authority and power
over welfare spending to the states. Under the old AFDC program, all
eligible adults and children were guaranteed benefits (although the
states determined the size of the benefits). This arrangement entitled
the states to receive automatic and unlimited reimbursements from the
federal government based on a formula (varying by state) that matched
federal dollars to state spending on eligible AFDC recipients. Under
the new legislation, the federal government instead will provide the
state with lump-sum payments—block grants for Temporary Assis
tance to Needy Families (TANF). In addition to AFDC cash benefits,
TANF funds would replace other welfare programs: Emergency Assis
tance, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS)
and child care funding for AFDC recipients and certain other lowincome families. Federal funding for the new block grants is set at
$16.4 billion annually through 2002. This is approximately equal to the
1995 combined level of federal funding on all of the commitments
listed above.
Federal grants to the individual states are based on their recent
spending on AFDC and JOBS. Supplemental federal grants are avail
able under special circumstances, such as above-average population
growth or high and rising levels of unemployment. A maintenance-ofeffort provision requires each state to spend its own funds at 75 percent
of what it spent in 1994 on the replaced programs.
The states are given broad authority to determine conditions of eligi
bility for TANF grants. However, the law does mandate that all states
set certain new conditions, including several provisions adopted by
individual states under waivers. Of particular importance is the imposi
tion of a lifetime limit of 60 months for receipt of TANF benefits. In
addition, adult recipients will be required to fulfill a work requirement
after a maximum of two years of benefits. Participants must spend at
least 20 hours a week in an approved work activity up to 1999, with the
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hours requirement rising to 30 hours in the year 2000 and after. States
are required to enroll 25 percent of their caseload in work activities by
1997, rising to 50 percent by 2002. (Higher participation rates are
required for two-parent families.) Among other restrictions, unwed
mothers under age 18 are ineligible for TANF benefits unless they live
in the home of an adult relative or in an arrangement—such as a group
home—supervised by an adult.
It is impossible at this stage to predict how restrictive the new law
will prove to be. For example, the five-year limit is likely to be less
stringent than it appears. Up to 20 percent of the caseload can be
exempted in cases of hardship. Moreover, states are not barred from
using their own funds to provide benefits to those who have reached
the five-year limit, and these funds could still be applied to their
required maintenance-of-effort payment.
This study examines information that is relevant for implementing
and assessing the possible impact of the new legislation. Some of the
required program changes, such as a five-year time limit, will be a
sharp departure from the status quo. Advocates of these changes point
to the beneficial effects that a "tough love" policy might have by push
ing welfare recipients toward independence; critics fear that most
recipients lack the skills to become self-supporting and argue that a
benefit cut-off would simply lead to greater deprivation for disadvantaged families.2
The objective of this study is to provide information and new data
analysis useful for informing three particular areas of concern raised
by a time-limited reform and more broadly by other reforms. One is
the extent to which recipients respond to changes in the incentives
imbedded in the welfare benefit system; the second involves the char
acteristics and work skills of welfare recipients; and the third is the
effectiveness of employment and training programs. The book is orga
nized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the AFDC program and examines
trends in the size and composition of the welfare population. We exam
ine the extent to which changes in the benefit structure may have
shaped the changes in the size of the caseload and influenced the
growth of female-headed families. In chapter 3 we describe patterns of
welfare use focusing on the duration of welfare participation, both in a
single episode and in multiple spells, and we examine the correlates of
short-term and long-term participation. We identify individuals who
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are likely to become long-term participants and compare their detailed
personal characteristics with those of participants who leave welfare
after a relatively short stay. An analysis is presented of the work experi
ence and earnings of women after leaving welfare, and a comparison is
made with the experience and earnings of women who were never on
welfare. Training and other program services can be more efficiently
targeted with this information.
Chapter 4 reviews the lessons that are to be derived from past initia
tives to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare recipients. After sum
marizing earlier efforts such as the WIN program, we examine the
experiments evaluating the effectiveness of recent work, education, and
training programs. Special programs targeted on young teenage moth
ers, as well as strict workfare programs, are distinguished from educa
tion and training programs for older mothers with school-age children.
Chapter 5 addresses questions concerning the capacity of state and
local government to implement a time-limited welfare reform, particu
larly when it is tied to an aggressive work-oriented program providing
for a significant increase in the number of welfare recipients participat
ing in work-related activities. Much was expected from the framework
established by the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills training program
(JOBS), created by Title III of the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988.
JOBS made participation in the various component programs manda
tory and required the targeting of program slots on certain subgroups
of AFDC recipients. Did the JOBS framework make a difference?
Chapter 5 also reviews the various experimental changes in the AFDC
program that have been made under the state waiver program during
the last few years.
Chapter 6 provides a summary and concluding comments, tying our
findings to the implementation and possible outcomes of welfare
reform.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of the political debate preceding the passage and signing of the new law
and a detailed account of the provision, see Katz (1996, p. 269).
2. Haveman and Scholz (1994-1995) discuss some of the concerns associated with time-lim
ited welfare and the general problems and conflicts inherent in any welfare reform.

CHAPTER

Program Description and Sources
of Caseload Growth
This chapter first reviews basic information about benefits, eligibil
ity, and broad participation trends in the AFDC program. It then exam
ines changes in family welfare participation in detail and the relation
between those changes and the growth in benefits, the number of fami
lies headed by women, and other explanatory factors. Understanding
the reaction of welfare recipients to past changes in benefit levels and
structure is helpful in assessing how recipients will respond to the new
legislation.

Program Description
AFDC, the nation's largest program of cash assistance to needy
families, was established under the Social Security Act of 1935 as Aid
to Dependent Children (ADC). Unlike social security, however, the
program has always been administered by the states, and funding has
been shared with the federal government. States set their own benefit
levels and establish financial criteria for eligibility, subject to federal
limitations and regulations. Benefits vary widely among the states. In
1996, among the continental U.S. states, the maximum monthly AFDC
cash benefit for a mother and two children with no other income
ranged from a high of $650 in Vermont to a low of $120 in Mississippi
(table 2.1).
The addition of food stamps significantly narrowed the range; the
combined AFDC and food stamp benefit for such a family was $882 in
Vermont and $433 in Mississippi. Free medical care (Medicaid) for all
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AFDC recipients and subsidized housing for many recipients further
supplement the value of the benefit package in all states.
Table 2.1 Maximum Monthly AFDC Benefit and Combined AFDC-Food
Stamp Benefit for a One-Parent Family of Three Persons; Five
Highest and Five Lowest States, Continental U.S.,
January 1996
Maximum.
AFDC benefit

Combined
AFDC-FS
benefit

Ratio: combined
benefit to cash
benefit

Highest benefit states
Vermont

650

882

1.36

Connecticut

636

872

1.37

California

607

852

1.40

New York3
Rhode Island

577
565

847
822

1.47

Mississippi

120

433

3.61

Alabama

164

477

2.91

Texas

188

501

2.66

Tennessee

185

498

2.69

Louisiana

190

503

2.65

389

699

1.80

1.45

Lowest benefit states

Median AFDC state

SOURCE: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1996 Green Book,
a. The benefit shown is for New York City. The cash benefit in Suffolk County is $703.

With respect to aggregate outlays, the federal and state governments
combined spent $22.0 billion on AFDC cash benefits in fiscal year
1995. State outlays totaled $10 billion, and the federal government
contributed matching funds of $12.0 billion. However, total federal and
state expenditures on AFDC families were about three times the
amount spent on cash benefits alone, since most of these families
received food stamps and Medicaid, and significant portions also
received benefits such as subsidized housing and supplemental food for
Women, Infants and Children (WIC).
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Eligibility

Eligibility for AFDC has been based on both family structure and
income. The program has provided benefits to families with children
under the age of 18 who have been deprived of parental support
because their father or mother is absent from the home continuously or
is deceased, incapacitated, or unemployed. Starting in 1961, it was
optional for a state to offer AFDC benefits to two-parent families in
which one parent was unemployed (the AFDC-UP Program), but after
1990 all states were required to have such a program. The conditions
for participation were more strict for these AFDC-UP families—the
unemployed parent must have had a significant work history prior to
application and could not work more than 100 hours in a month. 1
Although the extension of the AFDC-UP program to all states slightly
increased the percentage of UP cases, in practice most AFDC families
(typically 95 percent) have been one- parent families headed by the
mother. Thus, the number of female-headed families in the population
was a basic factor underlying the size and growth of the AFDC pro
gram.
Eligibility has also been based on two income tests. A family could
not receive benefits if its gross income exceeded 185 percent of the
state's need standard—an income standard set by the state for a given
family size. In addition, the family's net income could not exceed the
state's payment standard—the maximum benefit possible for a given
family size. Net income has been calculated by subtracting from total
income certain "disregards," including an earnings disregard (most
recently $30 in monthly earnings for the first twelve months) and onethird of remaining earnings for the first four months, plus work
expenses and child care allowances of $90 and $175 per month,
respectively. An asset test has also been applied: excluding the home
and one automobile, allowable resources have been limited to an equity
value of $1,000 (assets minus liabilities). For purely mechanical rea
sons, then, an increase in the maximum benefit level, or the payment
standard, automatically increases eligibility (as does an increase in the
income disregards), since the income cutoffs for program eligibility are
closely tied to these factors.
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Program Roots

When the ADC program was first established in the 1930s, the intent
was to improve the well-being of children who were caught unexpect
edly in deprived circumstances because of the loss of a father's sup
port, typically because of his death or disability. Since social security
had just been enacted and all workers were not yet covered, unsup
ported widowhood was a real possibility for many. The ADC benefits
enabled the mother to stay home and care for her children at a time
when work opportunities for women were more limited than today, and
work in the home was more time-consuming.
ADC was expected to wither away as social security matured, as
survivor benefits to workers' families became more generous and more
universal, and as women's work opportunities grew. But it did not
wither away. As depicted in figure 2.1, after slow program growth
Figure 2.1 AFDC Recipients as a Percent of Total U.S. Population

CD o

o 3

CD
Q_

0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1940 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin; The Green Book, 1994;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Monthly Population Estimates.
NOTE: 1940-1960 numbers reported in calendar years. 1961-1995 numbers reported in fiscal
years.

through the 1950s, participation in the program escalated sharply dur
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s. Between 1964 and 1972, some 6.5
million adults and children were added to the welfare rolls, and the
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proportion of the U.S. population on AFDC rose from about 2 percent
to 5 percent. After 1976, the total number of recipients stabilized while
the proportion of the population on welfare declined and fluctuated
around the 4.5 percent level throughout the 1980s. Starting in 1990,
welfare participation surged again, reaching a record high of 5.5 per
cent of the population in 1993. After stabilizing in 1994, participation
declined to 5.2 percent of the population in 1995.
Between the inception of AFDC and the present, a major change has
taken place in the reasons for a child's dependency on the program.
When the program began, the father's death or disability accounted for
75 percent of AFDC cases; but by 1969, this percentage had fallen to
17 percent and by 1991, to 5.6 percent. At the same time, the mother's
having no marriage tie became the most important basis for eligibility,
accounting for close to 60 percent of the families on AFDC in 1991
compared to 28 percent in 1969.
Caseload Growth Since 1960

In analyzing changes in AFDC participation, it is informative to
examine the change in the number of families or cases on welfare,
rather than the total number of recipients, which can include varying
proportions of children and adults.
Caseload growth can be measured in several ways. Figure 2.2 plots
the total caseload as a percentage of all families with children under 18
over the period 1960-1995; figure 2.3 shows only the BASIC AFDC
caseload (omitting families in the unemployed fathers program) as a
percentage of the subgroup of single mother (female-headed) families.
Both series reveal a sharply rising proportion of their respective popu
lations going on welfare between 1965 and 1976. But the proportion of
all families on welfare (figure 2.2) is the more steeply rising series over
the whole period (1960-1995), largely reflecting the substantial and
steady increase in the proportion of families headed by single mothers.
(As shown in figure 2.4, the proportion of families with children
headed by a single mother rose from 10.2 percent in 1965 to almost
23.0 percent in 1995.)
The proportion of all families receiving AFDC remained relatively
constant between 1976 and 1989, the net outcome of two offsetting
trends: one, a continuing but slower rate of increase in families headed
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Figure 2.2 Percent of AH Families with Children Receiving
AFDC 1960-1995
Percent
14 i
12
10
8
6

L

4
2

0 M I I I I I I I I I I I I I M I I I I M I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1995
1990
1985
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1975
1970
1965
1960
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin; The Green Book, 1994;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports; Income, Poverty, and Valuation of Noncash Benefits: 1994; Department of health and Human Services, unpublished tables.

Figure 2.3 Percent of All Single-Mother Families Receiving
AFDC 1960-1995
Percent
70

30 ©I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I | I
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960

1990

1995

SOURCE: The Green Book, 1994; U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 1994; Department of health and Human
Services, unpublished tables.

Lessons for Welfare Reform

11

by a single mother (figure 2.4); the second, a decline in AFDC partici
pation among female-headed families (figure 2.3). After 1989 a rise in
both the welfare participation rate of single mothers and the proportion
of families headed by a single mother resulted once again in a large
increase in the proportion of all families on welfare. 2 That proportion
declined in 1995, however, as both the proportion of families headed
by women and the proportion of female-headed families receiving wel
fare declined.
Figure 2.4 Single-Mother Families as a Percent of All Families
with Child

Percent
25 +
20
15
10
5
0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1960
1965
1970
1975 1980
1985
1990
1995
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports; Income, Poverty and Valua
tion ofNoncash Benefits: 1994.

Sources of Caseload Growth
The growth of the AFDC caseload was likely to be influenced by
many factors—demographic, economic, cultural, and programmatic.
We first focus on the relation between caseload growth and changes in
the financial incentives to go on welfare, both welfare benefits and
earnings opportunities, and then discuss the relation between those
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incentives and the growth in single-mother families, the primary group
eligible for benefits.
The Welfare Benefit Package

When the value of the welfare benefit package increases relative to
potential earnings, the pecuniary incentive to go on welfare also
increases. In many states a mother with two children who could earn
only the minimum wage would have to work 40 hours a week and 50
weeks a year to earn an income comparable to that provided by wel
fare.3 Studies of the incentive effects of the welfare system generally
have found that, other things the same, states with relatively high wel
fare benefits have tended to have relatively high rates of participation
in the AFDC program (Moffitt 1992).
Can changes in welfare benefits over the years account for changes
in welfare participation? The level of the real AFDC cash benefit taken
alone increased by a modest 10 percent between 1964 and 1972 and
then actually declined significantly as the states failed to increase cash
benefits enough to keep up with inflation (figure 2.5). By 1994, the
cash benefit in real terms was 34 percent below the 1964 level. Yet by
any measure, participation in the AFDC program in 1994 was consid
erably above that of 1964.
But it is highly misleading to focus only on the pattern of change in
the cash benefit, which has become an increasingly small component
of the total welfare package. A growing percentage of government
spending on the welfare population has taken the form of noncash ben
efits since 1964, with the introduction and expansion of programs such
as food stamps and other food programs for women and children (for
example, the WIC program), Medicaid, and subsidized housing. When
we estimate the combined value of benefits received from the three
major programs—AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid—the benefit
package is shown to have increased substantially (after adjusting for
inflation) between 1964 and 1976 (figure 2.5).4 Although the combined
benefit declined between 1976 and 1994, that decline is much more
modest than the decline in the cash benefit alone. As a result, in 1994,
the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the combined benefit package
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remained 60 percent above the level of benefits provided in 1964 when
benefits were largely confined only to the cash component.
Figure 2.5 Annual Benefits for a Family of Four (1995 $)
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The combined welfare benefit package would seem to be a more
appropriate measure for judging the gain from going on welfare than
the cash component alone (see note 3). And over the past thirty years
taken as a whole, changes in welfare participation have roughly corre
sponded with the change in the total benefit package, although the rela
tion is stronger between 1964 and 1976 than in the period thereafter.
The Role of Earnings Opportunities

Opportunities for earning an income off welfare also contribute to
the financial incentive to go on welfare and, therefore, should be taken
into account. We show earnings trends of women and men, 25-34 years
of age, with and without high school diplomas, since a large proportion
of AFDC participants do not go beyond high school (figure 2.6). Male
earnings trends are shown because they help reflect the potential
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income women may receive from marriage. As depicted, the earnings
of 25-34-year-old men, at or below the high school level, have declined
significantly in real terms since the late 1970s. The earnings of women
in these age-education groupings remained fairly constant until the late
1980s, but declined somewhat during the 1990-92 recession.
Figure 2.6 Median Annual Earnings of Year-Round, Full-Time
Workers, 25-34 Years Old (1995 $)
40,000

35,000

10,000
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Year

As a consequence of the sharp decline in men's earnings, the com
bined AFDC benefit level rose relative to men's earnings in the 1980s
(figure 2.7). That factor may have contributed to the increase in femaleheaded families in the 1980s and to the steady level of AFDC participa
tion measured as a percent of all families with children (figure 2.2),
even though the level of the total benefit package declined modestly.
Benefits declined as a percentage of women's earnings (figure 2.8)
through the mid 1980s, but rose relative to their earnings in the late
1980s through the early 1990s. The rise in this ratio also may have con
tributed to the rise in single-parent families, as well as in welfare par-
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Figure 2.7 AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits as a Share of Median
Earnings of Males
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Figure 2.8 AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits as a Share of Median
Earnings of Females
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ticipation, particularly among high school dropouts for whom these
benefits-to-earnings patterns were more pronounced.
Have Welfare Benefits Influenced the Rise in Single-Mother Families?

The significant growth in female-headed families (figure 2.4) has
been the main source of any increase in the AFDC caseload since 1970,
as the AFDC participation rate among female-headed families has
declined for much of that time (figure 2.3). An important question then
is whether the increase in families headed by a single mother has itself
been motivated by the growth in welfare benefits or, alternatively, has
been an entirely independent phenomenon unrelated to the welfare
program.
There are theoretical grounds for believing that increases in welfare
income would have a positive effect on the formation of female-headed
families, since the availability of benefits enables a woman to support
her children outside marriage and without working. However, the
strength of the effect would depend on the amount of income provided
by welfare compared to the income attainable off welfare—through
marriage and/or work, as well as individual attitudes toward welfare
recipiency.5
The existing social science literature, however, has not provided a
clear answer to the question of whether increases in the value of the
welfare benefit package influence out-of-wedlock childbearing and
other behaviors associated with the formation in female-headed fami
lies. Summing up the results of seventy-one studies of the effects of
welfare on marriage and fertility, Robert A. Moffitt (1996) has recently
concluded:
The research literature on the effects of welfare on marriage and
fertility contains a large number of studies. The studies use a wide
variety of methodologies and data sets and cover different time
periods over the last thirty years. Unfortunately, aside from a few
patterns that have been established, the findings of the studies are
extremely diverse, ranging from findings of no effect of welfare to
findings of strong negative effects of welfare on marriage and pos
itive effects on fertility, particularly nonmarital (Summary, p. i).

Moffitt notes, however, that while studies from the 1970s found little or
no evidence of an effect of welfare on marriage and out-of-wedlock
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childbearing, more recent studies have arrived at a "rough consensus"
supporting an effect, although the magnitude of such an effect varies
among the studies.
Of course, the relative generosity of welfare benefits is not the only
factor influencing the formation of single-mother families. Another
causal factor that is likely to have increased in significance over the
past two decades is the growing ability of women to support them
selves through work. The increases in women's skills and work partici
pation and the rise in women's earnings relative to men's may have
primarily reduced fertility and delayed marriage, but also may have
contributed to the rise in female-headed families by enabling women to
be economically independent. Women with relatively high earnings are
less likely to go on welfare, however, although the existence of welfare
could provide an insurance safety net. Thus it should not be expected
that welfare participation and female-headed families would rise and
fall in tandem, even if the availability and generosity of welfare was a
significant factor influencing the level of female-headed families
among women with poor earnings prospects.
The observation has been made that welfare cannot account for the
rise in female-headed families that occurred between 1970 and the late
1980s, since caseload growth leveled off after 1975 while the total
number of families headed by women continued to rise rapidly. The
caseload, however, was undergoing a significant compositional change
during this period, as the subgroup of women who had never married
comprised an increasingly large share of the AFDC caseload, rising
from about one-third in 1975 to about 58 percent in 1988. In conse
quence, while the total number of AFDC families increased only
slightly between 1975 and 1988, the number of AFDC families headed
by a woman whose children were born out-of-wedlock almost doubled.
Presumably, that rise in never-married mothers on AFDC was offset by
declining participation of formerly-married female heads. The rise in
earnings opportunities for women with higher levels of skill would
help explain the participation decline for this group.
The Role of Program Changes

Changes in the rules governing earnings disregards have also had an
impact on AFDC caseload trends, although the intended objective to
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increase work incentives has not always been the result. Consequently,
government policy on this issue has changed sharply over time.
As part of the Work Incentive program (WIN) enacted in 1967,
monetary work incentives (the earnings disregards) were introduced.
These incentive provisions changed the AFDC benefit formula to allow
recipients who worked to keep a larger share of their benefits as their
earnings increased than was possible under earlier programs. 6 The
objective of this so-called "30 and a third" provision was to encourage
welfare mothers to increase their work effort and, as a result, "to work
their way off welfare." Yet the proportion of AFDC mothers who
worked from 1961 to 1975—the period spanning before and after the
1967 "incentive provisions"—changed little, fluctuating between 15
and 16 percent (Council of Economic Advisers, 1976, p. 99 and table
2.2 in the text below.
In other respects, the WIN earnings disregard provision may have
indirectly reduced work effort and increased the AFDC caseload. By
enhancing the-income attainable from welfare, it reduced the incentive
to leave welfare completely. Moreover, welfare was made accessible to
a new group of women whose higher earnings previously would have
made them ineligible (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis). The WIN
disregards appear to have increased the AFDC caseload. At the same
time, the work participation of women receiving AFDC remained con
siderably below that of single mothers not participating in the program.
As shown in table 2.2, in 1975 only 16 percent of AFDC mothers
worked compared to 32 percent of all never-married mothers, 57 per
cent of all mothers who were divorced or separated, and 41 percent of
married mothers.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) essen
tially removed the earnings disregard provisions in the AFDC program
that had been introduced by WIN, although they were later partially
restored in 1984 and 1988 legislation. 7 In addition, states were prohib
ited from paying AFDC benefits to any family with income exceeding
150 percent of a state's standard of need (raised to a threshold of 185
percent by the 1984 legislation). These changes reduced the amount a
person could earn and still remain on AFDC. Studies have shown that
the OBRA caps and the repeal of the disregards played a significant
role in reducing the caseload at the national level, as well as in certain
states (O'Neill 1990a; Peskin, Topogna, and Marcotte 1992). Thus,
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OBRA was a contributing factor to the observed modest caseload
decline in the 1980s.
Table 2.2 Employed Mothers as a Percentage of All Mothers (with
Children under 18), by Marital Status and for AFDC
Participants, 1975-1992

Year

Married,
spouse present

Never
married

Divorced,
separated,
widowed

AFDC
mothers

1975

40.5

32.1

56.8

16

1980

50.9

39.9

63.0

n.a.

1981

52.1

38.3

62.9

14

1982

51.6

36.2

61.9

7

1983

52.4

34.5

58.4

5

1984

54.9

62.8

1985

56.8

36.3
39.2

63.0

5
n.a.

1986

57.6

37.8

65.6

6

1987

60.4

40.2

66.2

6

1988

61.9

40.2

65.9

6

1989

63.1

43.1

65,9

6

1990

63.5

45.1

67.9

7

1991

63.2

44.0

66.1

n.a.

1992

63.9

43.4

65.3

6

SOURCE: Percentage employed by marital status is derived from unpublished data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The employment of AFDC mothers is from U.S. House of Representa
tives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book 1992 and 7994.

The effects of OBRA on women's work participation are complex.
OBRA reduced the caseload, thereby increasing the number of women
in the population who are likely to work; at the same time it reduced
work participation among AFDC recipients (table 2.2). The net out
come of these effects is ambiguous.
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Recent Caseload Developments

The prolonged economic downturn that started after 1989 may have
had a particularly severe impact on young, low-skilled workers, and
these effects would not be adequately captured by the earnings' series
that refer to full-time, year-round workers. In a detailed study of the
determinants of caseload change, a Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) study (Peskin 1993) estimated that about one-quarter of the
caseload increase between 1989 and 1992 could be attributed to sag
ging employment and rising unemployment. The CBO also estimated
that one-half of the recent increase in the size of the AFDC caseload
could be attributed to increases in female-headed families. However, as
discussed above, changes in the number of female-headed families
itself is likely to respond to changes in earnings opportunities off wel
fare and benefits on welfare. Consequently, it is difficult to determine
how much of the caseload growth is really explained by economic fac
tors versus growth in female-headed families.
About 15 percent of recent caseload growth is unexplained by the
CBO model. Among the factors that could have contributed to this
growth but are difficult to quantify, are several policy changes cited in
the CBO report. One factor is the impact of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which legalized 2.6 million undocu
mented aliens. Although the Act instituted a five-year waiting period
for AFDC eligibility following legalization, it appears that after 1987,
some aliens began to claim benefits for their children born in the
United States, since they themselves no longer faced deportation by
making their presence known to the government. Moreover, the fiveyear waiting period would have ended in the spring of 1992 for many
aliens, thereby making a large new population group eligible for bene
fits.
A second policy change that coincided with the recent surge in case
load growth is the implementation of the Family Support Act of 1988.
Although the JOBS component of the Act (the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills training program) was expected to help reduce the AFDC
caseload, it is possible that it actually increased the caseload in the
short run by delaying the exit of those engaged in training. Moreover,
the provision of transitional benefits (subsidized child care and Medicaid) for a twelve-month period after leaving AFDC may have made
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AFDC more attractive to some individuals, thereby increasing program
entry rates.
By the end of 1994 and throughout 1995, the AFDC caseload
declined both in absolute terms and as a percentage of families, no
matter how defined. Preliminary data show a continuing decline in the
first half of 1996.
No doubt the decline is related to recovery from the recession of the
early 1990s and the accompanying sharp drop in unemployment,
although other factors may also be relevant. For example, in the past
few years (prior to the passage of welfare reform) many states have
adopted measures making welfare less generous and harder to get, or
have conducted other reform initiatives under waivers granted by the
Department of Health and Human Services. However, evaluations of
these efforts are not yet available. The 1996 welfare reform legislation
went into effect at the end of 1996, and states are only beginning to
restructure their programs in response to the legislation. Although the
new regime is likely to result in further reductions in caseload, it is
impossible at this time to predict the long-run effects of the new law
with any precision.
Other recent programmatic changes that enhance the disposable
incomes of low-wage workers may also help to reduce the welfare
caseload. The earned income tax credit (EITC), which provides a
refundable tax credit for low-wage earners, has been liberalized. In
addition, Medicaid has been extended to pregnant women and children
in low-income families not on AFDC.
NOTES
1. A number of states have obtained waivers under JOBS to experiment with dropping the
work history requirement for married couples with children and unemployed parents. (See chapter
5.)
2. Since 1980, the unemployed parent component of AFDC (AFDC-UP) has tended to
increase somewhat faster than the BASIC (single mother) component, further causing the total
caseload (BASIC plus AFDC-UP) to rise faster than the BASIC component alone. Effective Octo
ber 1990, under the Family Support Act of 1988, all states were required to have an AFDC-UP
program for two-parent families. AFDC-UP accounted for 6.8 percent of all AFDC cases in 1992
and 7.6 percent in 1994, reflecting a rise from 5.1 percent in 1989. Based on past cyclical behavior
of the AFDC-UP caseload, the recent rise appears to be more the result of higher unemployment
than the result of the extension of eligibility.
3. In 1993, sixteen states paid to a single-parent family with two children and no earnings a
combined AFDC and food stamp benefit that exceeded $700 a month or $8.400 per year. If a
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mother worked 2,000 hours per year (an unusually heavy work schedule for a mother with young
children) she would earn $8,500 if paid at the minimum hourly wage of $4.25. Although she
would be eligible for the earned income tax credit (EITC) and a smaller food stamp benefit, she
would pay social security taxes and incur child care, transportation and other work expenses, and
she would have less access to medical benefits and subsidized housing than a welfare mother.
4. Data for the combined AFDG-food stamp benefit level (for a family of four with no other
income) are from U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1992, and
unpublished data, expressed in 1995 dollars using the CPI-XI. The value of Medicaid was
obtained using program data on Medicaid expenditures for AFDC cash recipients (children and
adults separately). These data were adjusted to exclude disproportionate share expenditures
(DSH) and to include payments made to HMOs for AFDC recipients. Total adjusted payments
were divided by the average monthly number of AFDC adult and child recipients to obtain an
approximation of the insurance value of Medicaid per adult and per child. We assumed that this
insurance value or "market value" measured the value of medicaid coverage to AFDC recipients.
A more precise measure is "recipient value," and it is usually somewhat less than the market value
of an in-kind benefit. However, recipient value is very difficult to measure empirically.
The total family benefit is for the more typical family of one adult and two children. Since the
charge for a family premium for health insurance usually is constant across families with varying
numbers of children, the benefit for the family of three was also used for the family of four in our
example. In 1994, the estimated premium for such a family was $4,460. This is close to the low
end .of costs for a comprehensive HMO policy including the combined employer and employee
shares. Medicaid covers drugs and frequently dental and optical services, which are often
excluded from standard health insurance. It is, however, difficult to compare the level and quality
of care provided by medicaid with that of private health care. The estimated Medicaid benefit for
the years 1976-1994 is expressed in 1995 dollars using the PCE deflator for services. The deflator
for medical services was not used because of the likely substantial overstatement of medical infla
tion in the data due to failure to adjust for quality changes in medical care.
5. The theoretical framework for analyzing family behavior in the context of the gains for mar
riage versus alternatives (e.g., welfare) derives from Gary S. Decker. See Decker (1981).
6. Prior to the 1967 Amendments, earned income in many states was subject to an implicit 100
percent tax—a mother lost one dollar in welfare benefits for each dollar earned. Under the WIN
"income disregard" provisions, a recipient lost nothing in welfare payments until she earned at
least $30 per month (after deducting child care costs and other work-related expenses), and then
her welfare payment was reduced by only 66 cents for every dollar earned beyond $30 per month.
7. Some states have received federal waivers in their operation of education and training pro
grams, allowing them to experiment with more generous provisions of earnings disregards. (See
chapter 5.)

CHAPTER

Patterns of Welfare and Work
Participation and Their Correlates
This chapter analyzes recent patterns of welfare use and work par
ticipation among young mothers (through their early thirties) and the
characteristics associated with the different patterns observed. Among
the topics addressed are: the factors associated with both the incidence
of welfare participation and the duration of time spent on welfare; dif
ferences in the characteristics of short-term and long-term participants;
the work experience, earnings, and incomes of those who leave wel
fare; and the potential market earnings of those who stay on welfare.
The analysis also provides information on the characteristics of
those who are most likely to encounter difficulties in leaving welfare.
Specifically, we describe the characteristics of those who stay on wel
fare for short and long periods under the current system. Although it is
anticipated that the imposition of a time-limited welfare reform will
change the motivation, and therefore the welfare and work patterns, of
those who go on welfare, the extent of those changes is not known with
any certainty.
We utilize two data sources in this chapter. The first is the Current
Population Survey (CPS), which every March collects supplementary
information identifying persons who received AFDC during the pre
ceding calendar year. This is a large national sample of the U.S. popu
lation, and detail is provided on the characteristics of individuals and
their families and households. However, receipt of AFDC benefits is
believed to be underreported by the CPS, particularly among those
who received benefits for only a portion of the year or who were no
longer recipients as of the March survey date (Goudreau, Oberheu, and
Denton 1984). Appendix A compares CPS and official caseload esti-
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mates of AFDC recipients and examines reasons for the differences in
estimates.
Our major data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY)—a microdata file of approximately 10,000 civilian men and
women, first interviewed in 1979 when they were 14 to 22 years of age
and reinterviewed each year. We include survey results for women
through 1992 when they had reached ages 27 to 35. Thus the survey
follows young women over a period of their life cycle when many
types of dysfunctional behaviors develop, including early out-of-wedlock births and welfare dependency. The NLSY provides information
on these and many other characteristics, such as parental background,
schooling, and, what is particularly unique, academic achievement
measured by the youth's score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT), which was administered to all respondents.

Overview of Welfare Participation
We start with a summary table showing CPS data on the proportion
of women who have a child under age 18, the proportion of mothers
who are not currently married, and the incidence of AFDC receipt
among two cross sections of women ages 16-49, one taken in 1987 and
the other in 1992 (table 3.1). 1
Only a small percentage of women ages 16-49 in the population are
heads of AFDC families (4.1 percent in 1987, 4.5 percent in 1992).
However, to fit into this category, a woman must be a mother and be
without the support of a husband. In 1992, 51 percent of all women
ages 16-49 were mothers of children under the age of 18 years. Of
these, 27 percent were single (i.e., never-married, divorced, separated,
or widowed). As shown in table 3.1, close to 9 percent of all mothers
and one-third of single mothers headed AFDC families in 1992.
Welfare receipt is strongly related to age, with women in their twen
ties having the highest incidence. In 1992, 7.4 percent of all women
ages 20-24 received AFDC, compared to 3.5 percent of those at ages
35-39. The proportion of women who have children is still low at ages
20-24 (only 30 percent have children compared to 74 percent at ages
35-39). But those who do have children are more likely to be single

Table 3.1 Percentage of Women who have Children under Age 18, Mothers who are Single, and the Receipt of
AFDC, 1987 and 1992; Women 16-49 Years of Age

Age

Women with children
under 18 as percent
of all women

Single mothers
as a percent
of all mothers

Percent receiving AFDC
Of all women

Of all mothers

Of all single mothers

1987

1992

1987

1992

1987

1992

1987

1992

1987

1992

16-19

7.9

8.6

68.2

70.8

1.9

2.5

23.4

29.7

34.4

42.0

20-24

30.6

30.5

38.9

46.7

6.0

7.4

19.7

24.3

50.6

52.1

25-29

55.5

55.0

26.5

32.1

6.0

7.6

10.9

13.9

41.1

43.3

30.34

72.0

70.1

21.9

24.3

5.7

33.2

33.6

74.9

74.2

20.9

22.3

3.5

7.3
4.9

8.2

35-39

5.2
3~7

4.8

23.7

21.4

40-49

50.3

49.1

20.2

21.7

1.9

1.9

3.8

3.9

18.7

18.2

16-49

50.8

51.2

24.7

27.0

4.1

4.5

8.1

8.9

32.8

32.8

SOURCE: Current Population Survey, micro data files, March 1988 and March 1993.
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mothers—46.7 percent of the younger mothers compared to 22.3 per
cent of the older mothers in 1992. Young single mothers are also much
more likely to go on welfare than are older single mothers. Thus, 52
percent of single mothers ages 20-24 were on AFDC in 1992, com
pared to 21 percent of single mothers in the age group 35-39. The inci
dence of AFDC receipt among single mothers increased slightly
between 1987 and 1992 among women under the age of 30, but was
unchanged overall as the proportion of women in their thirties and for
ties increased relative to other age groups.

Incidence and Duration of Welfare Participation: The Role
of Marital Status and Age at Birth of First Child
The number of AFDC families that we observe at any point in time
is the result of decisions made by two groups of family heads. The first
refers to the decision whether to go on AFDC made by those who are
not yet on welfare. (This is the incidence of participation.) The other
decision is made by families already on AFDC and concerns whether
to stay with the program or to leave, and this decision influences the
duration of time spent on AFDC. In this section we utilize the longitu
dinal information in the NLSY to describe patterns of welfare use and
the characteristics associated with greater incidence and greater dura
tion.
Welfare Incidence

Table 3.2 examines the percentage of women who ever received
welfare during the 14-year period 1978 through 1991 for all women in
the NLSY who had a first birth between 1978 and 1984. The table viv
idly demonstrates the importance of both an out-of-wedlock birth and
teenage motherhood as predictors of welfare receipt. Of course the two
factors are highly correlated. As shown in the second row of the table,
55.7 percent of mothers who had a first child before reaching age 18
bore that child out-of-wedlock; this percentage falls to 15.7 percent for
women bearing a first child at age 20 or older.
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The combined effect of early childbearing and an out-of-wedlock
birth is powerful: 82 percent of women who were both younger than
age 18 and unmarried at the time of their first birth eventually went on
welfare. Although the effect is weaker among older women, out-ofwedlock childbearing continues to be associated with a high probabil
ity of welfare use. (The probability of welfare receipt is 72.5 percent if
the mother is unwed but is age 20 or older.) Still, age at first birth
appears to be strongly related to future welfare receipt among women
who were married at the time of their first birth. The proportion of mar
ried women who ever went on welfare was 47 percent if the mother
was younger than age 18 at first birth and falls to 16 percent if she was
age 20 or older.
Table 3.2 Percent Unmarried at First Birth and Percent Ever on Welfare
During 1978-1991 by Marital Status and Age of Mother at First
Birth: NLSY Women with a First Birth between 1978 and 1984
Age of mother at first birth
Under 18

18-19

20 or older

All mothers (OOOs)

666

1,421

3,420

Percent unmarried at first birth

55.7

36.6

15.7

Percent ever on welfare, 1978-91

66.9

47.6

24.8

Married at first birth (OOOs)

295

900

2,883

Percent ever on welfare, 1978-91

47.3

30.6

15.9

Unmarried at first birth (OOOs)

371

520

537

Percent ever on welfare, 1978-91

82.4

77.0

72.5

Sample size

259

496

933

SOURCE: NLSY microfiles.
NOTE: Population totals and all percentages are weighted to national totals.

Further detail about the timing of entry onto welfare after having a
first birth is shown in table 3.3. The proportion entering welfare is
again classified by age and marital status of mother at first birth, but
now the data are grouped into three narrow windows of time when
births took place: 1978-81; 1982-84; 1985-87. What table 3.3 plainly
shows is that an out-of-wedlock first birth is strongly associated with

Table 3.3 Proportion of NLSY Mothers Entering Welfare by Timing of Entry, Year of First Birth, Marital Status,
and Age of Mother at First Birth
First birth out-of-wedlock

Married at time of first birth

Mothers age at birth

Mothers age at birth

All ages

Under 20

20 years
or older

0-2 years after first birth

50.8

49.8

54.3

7.3

9.9

5.4

3-5 years after first birth

16.3

18.3

9.3

9.4

15.2

5.0

6-8 years after first birth

5.8

6.6

3.4

5.4

6.7

4.4

9-10 years after first birth

5.3

6.2

2.4

3.7

4.9

2.8

Cummulative percent on
welfare through 1991

78.2

80.9

69.4

25.8

36.7

17.8

0-2 years after first birth

48.8

52.2

46.7

7.9

14.4

6.7

3-5 years after first birth

13.3

6.1

17.6

3.9

6.2

3.5

6-8 years after first birth

2.6

2.2

2.8

3.1

6.6

2.4

All ages

Under 20

20 years
or older

Year of first birth is 1978-1981
Percent entered welfare

Year of first birth is 1982-1984
Percent entered welfare

Cummulative percent on
welfare through 1991 a
Year of first birth is 1985-1987
Percent entered welfare
0-2 years after first birth

64.7

63.4

67.1

14.9

27.2

12.6

34.1

n.o.

34.1

4.7

n.o.

4.7

3.0
n.o
3.0
4.3
n.o.
4.3
3-5 years after first birth
Cummulative percent
on welfare through 1991 a____39.0______n.o.______39.0______93______n.o_______9.3
NOTE: n.o. = no observations on this group in the sample.
a. Cummulative percent may include a small percentage in categories of years since birth not separately shown.
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entry onto welfare within two years of the birth, regardless of the age
of the mother. Approximately 50 percent of unwed mothers go on wel
fare during the two years following their first birth. By the end of ten
years, close to 80 percent have joined the caseload.
Among women who are married at first birth, entry onto welfare is
expected to be delayed, since it takes time for a marriage to unravel.
Although there is a tendency for the proportion of women entering
welfare among this group to be greater in the first two years after birth
than subsequently, this pattern is not as consistent or as pronounced as
the pattern for unwed mothers.
A reading of these tables indicates that external economic events are
also likely to influence welfare entry. That is, the high proportion of
teenage married women going on welfare shortly after their first birth
in 1982-84 may be attributable in some part to the recession of 198283. The recession may also have accounted for the bulge in welfare
entry three to five years after first birth for young married women
whose first birth was in 1978-81.
Welfare Duration

The length of time a recipient stays on welfare is a crucial dimen
sion of the welfare problem, and it is obviously a key factor in imple
menting a reform with a time limit. There are several ways of
describing welfare duration, as illustrated in table 3.4. The first two
columns refer to periods of welfare participation starting from the indi
vidual's first entry onto the welfare rolls. However, while the first col
umn refers only to the first period of continuous welfare participation
(the first welfare spell), the second column includes all years of welfare
participation observed, which may include several spells of participa
tion separated by periods of nonparticipation. 2
The importance of considering multiple spells is highlighted in table
3.4. If only the first spell is counted, about half of welfare participants
exit the program within two years, although somewhat more than a
quarter of the participants receive benefits for more than five years.
This result corresponds to findings from previous studies of welfare
dynamics (for example, Bane and Ellwood 1983; O'Neill, Wolf, Bassi,
and Hannan 1984; Ellwood 1986; O'Neill, Bassi, and Wolf 1987;
Blank 1989). Nonetheless, recidivism is also relatively high. If all
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years on AFDC are counted (from all spells), then the proportion stay
ing on longer than two years rises to close to 70 percent, and the pro
portion accumulating more than five years ,of participation rises to 42
percent.
Table 3.4 Proportion of Welfare Recipients Remaining on Welfare
Longer than a Specified Number of Years Under Different
Ways of Defining Welfare Duration (NLSY women with a first
birth in 1978 or later)
Women starting a first AFDC spell Women on AFDC
in 1978-1984
in 1991
Counting total
Years on welfare Counting years in years on AFDC
1978-1991
first spell only
more than
1
0.829
0.639

Counting total
years on AFDC
1978-1991
0.886

2

0.496

0.688

0.810

3

0.384

0.558

0.729

4

0.320

0.501

0.658

5

0.268

0.418

0.559

3.83

5.13

6.45

1,506

1,506

1,275

607

607

517

Mean years
Population (000s)a
Sample size

NOTE: Recipients are restricted to women surveyed by the NLSY in 1992 and with complete wel
fare information for 1978-1991. These women were ages 26-33 in 1991.
a. The population is weighted to reflect national totals.

Although only 42 percent of all women who went on AFDC accu
mulated more than five years of participation, this group makes up the
majority of women who are observed as part of the caseload at a partic
ular point in time. The welfare duration of women who were counted
in the caseload in 1991 is shown in column 3 of table 3.4. The domi
nance of the caseload by long-term participants is evident: More than
80 percent of the women had spent more than two years in the pro
gram, and 56 percent were on the rolls for more than five years.
The age and marital status of the mother at the time of her first birth
are important predictors of welfare duration, just as they were for the

Table 3.5 Proportion of Welfare Recipients on Welfare More than a Specified Number of Total Years, from Time of
Entry Through 1991: NLSY Mothers Starting a First AFDC Spell in 1978-1984, by Marital Status and
Age at Time of Birth
Total years on welfare
are greather than

Under age 20 at first birth
Out-of-wedlock
Married
first birth
at first birth

Age 20 or older at first birth
Out-of-wedlock
first birth

Married
at first birth

1

0.890

0.714

0.910

0.738

2

0.756

0.585

0.717

0.581

3

0.633

0.460

0.577

0.421

4

0.590

0.388

0.468

0.379

5

0.504

0.298

0.402

0.318

6

0.408

0.253

0.357

0.293

7

0.346

0.206

0.279

0.204

8

0.273a

0.1423

0.1763

0.0503

Mean years

5.81

4.31

4.98

4.02

Population (00s)b

789

400

152

165

Sample size

373

116

65

53

a. Estimates is unreliable since a portion of the sample was exposed to AFDC for less than 8 years.
b. Population numbers are weighted to reflect national totals.
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probability of ever going on welfare in the first place. Table 3.5 shows
these relationships through the concept of duration, portrayed in col
umn 2 of table 3.4 (namely, total years accumulated on welfare through
1991 for women first going on AFDC in the period 1978-1984).
Among women younger than age 20 and unwed at the time of first
birth, 50 percent accumulated more than five years on welfare and 35
percent participated longer than seven years. A first birth at an older
age reduced duration somewhat, but those who were married at first
birth had significantly shorter periods of participation.
Table 3.6 displays the distribution of duration probabilities (count
ing multiple spells), by race and Hispanic ethnicity and by marital sta
tus at first birth, for women starting a welfare spell in 1978-1984.
Although duration differs substantially between racial and ethnic
groups, the difference by marital status within the same racial/ethnic
group is even more pronounced. For example, among white women the
average number of years spent on welfare through 1991 was 5.27 years
for unwed mothers and 4.09 years for married mothers—a difference
of 1.18 years. However, when we compare duration across racial/ethnic
groups among women who bore their first child out-of-wedlock, we
find that the average years spent on welfare were 5.27 years for white
women, 6 years for black women, and 5.64 years for Hispanic
women—a differential of 0.73 years between white and black women
and only 0.37 years between white and Hispanic women.
Although age at first birth, marital status, and race/ethnicity are
important correlates of benefit duration, it is also true that other factors
influence how long a recipient stays on welfare. This is because dura
tion varies considerably among women of the same marital status, age
at first birth, and race/ethnicity. We turn now to a broader examination
of the characteristics of women who leave welfare and those who stay.

Characteristics of Nonparticipants and of Welfare
Leavers and Stayers
The characteristics of NLSY women with a first birth in 1978-1982
are shown in table 3.7. Panel A of the table shows women classified by
marital status at first birth and by whether they ever received welfare

Table 3.6 Proportion of Welfare Recipients on Welfare More Than a Specified Number of Total Years, from Entry
through 1991: NLSY Women Starting a First Welfare Spell in 1978-1984 by Race and Hispanic Origin
and Marital Status at First Birth
Black

White

Hispanic

Total years on
welfare are
greater than

Out-ofwedlock first
birth

Married at
first birth

Out-ofwedlock first
birth

Married at
first birth

Out-ofwedlock first
birth

Married at
first birth

1

0.896

0.784

0.892

0.689

0.882

0.889

2

0.772

0.695

0.708

0.558

0.815

0.669

3

0.662

0.582

0.560.

0.417

0.695

0.549

4

0.606

0.494

0.516

0.358

0.618

0.477

5

0.526

0.449

0.438

0.274

0.487

0.381

6

0.447

0.332

0.340

0.254

0.400

0.284

7

0.370

0.285

0.290

0.190

0.331

0.244

8

0.282a

0.4608

0.231 s

0.1 24a

0.233a

0.115a

Mean years to date

6.00

4.75

5.27

4.09

5.64

4.72

Population (000s)b

486

56

379

445

76

63

Sample size

294

33

72

82

72

54

a. Estimate is unreliable since a portion of the sample was exposed to AFDC for less than 8 years,
b. Population numbers are weighted to reflect national totals.
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Table 3.7 Characteristics (Weighted) of NLSY Women with a First Birth
in 1978-1982 and Work/Welfare Status in 1988-89, by Welfare
Participation since First Birth and Marital Status at Time
of Birth
Out-of-wedlock
first birth
Ever on
welfare

Never on
welfare

Married at first birth
Ever on
welfare

Never on
welfare

Population (OOOs)

828

274

656

2,108

Sample size

461

120

248

607

A. All women with a first birth 1978-1982
Age at first birth (%)
Under 18

34.5

32.5

21.0

8.3

18 or 19

39.0

34.0

35.4

24.8

20 or more

26.5

33.5

43.6

66.8

% Black

54.4

33.5

8.7

5.6

9.4

11.0

10.9

7.8

% white

36.1

55.5

80.4

86.6

& not H.S. grad at birth of
first child

56.0

26.5

47.7

21.0

% not H.S. grad in 1989

32.5

10.6

31.6

10.8

AFQT percentile score

23.5

34.3

32.5

47.3

% at or below 10th
percentile

32.3

16.9

14.2

7.0

Months on AFDC, first
birth thru 1989

47.0

0.0

25.0

0.0

% ever married

53.9

71.8

100.0

100.0

% worked before first birth

53.9

62.4

73.0

83.6

% Hispanic

Weeks worked in 19781988

146.0

262.0

193.0

325.0

% worked in 1988 or 1989

78.3

84.5

81.5

84.8

% off welfare in 1988 and
1989

48.7

100.0

55.1

100.0

36

Table 3.7 (continued)
Out-of-wedlock
first birth
Ever on
welfare

Married at first birth

Never on
welfare

Ever on
welfare

Never on
welfare

B. Off welfare in 1988 and 1989
AFQT percentile score

28.1

34.3

36.1

47.3

% at or below 10th
percentile

21.0

16.9

11.9

7.0

Not H.S. grad in 1989

23.6

10.6

35.1

10.8

Months on AFDC, first
birth thru 1989

26.0

0.0

15.5

0.0

% ever married

69.5

71.8

100.0

100.0

% married in 1989 or 1990

53.2

55.4

75.9

84.4

% worked in 1988 or 1989

91.7

84.5

89.5

84.8

No. of children

2.0

1.7

2.1

2.2

Family income in 1989a

$22,349

$24,860

$24,120

$36,284

Married

$30,071

$33,300

$29,475

$40,793

Not married

$14,695

$16,199

$12,144

$17,578

AFQT percentile score

18.4

-

28.5

--

% at or below 10th
percentile

40.8

..

12.7

„

Not H.S. grad in 1989

43.6

--

27.8

-

Months on AFDC, first
birth thru 1989

71.9

_

40.5

_

2.4

--

2.3

-

AFDC income, 1989

$4,084

--

$3,520

--

Family income, 19893

$10,223

--

$12,461

--

On welfare in 1989

No. of children

a. Family income includes the income from earnings and other sources of the woman and her
spouse, if she is married. The reported cash value of foodstamps received is also included in this
measure.
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during the period from first birth through 1989. Panel B provides data
on those who left welfare and were off the program for all of 1988 and
1989. Panel C provides data on those who were on the AFDC program
in 1989.
It is apparent that women who go on welfare have been low achiev
ers in other aspects of their lives. Achievement in basic verbal and
math skills can be measured in the NLSY by scores on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which was administered to mem
bers of the NLSY panel.3 Welfare recipients who bore their first child
out-of-wedlock (56 percent were in this category), on average, scored
only at the 23.5th percentile on the AFQT.4 Moreover, close to onethird of this group scored at the 10th percentile of the AFQT distribu
tion, a level of competence so low it would restrict access to many
jobs. The average AFQT score of welfare recipients who were married
at the time of their first birth was somewhat higher—at the 32.5th per
centile—while only 14 percent scored at the 10th percentile. By con
trast, the average test score of women who were married at first birth
and never went on welfare was close to the median, and only 7 percent
scored at or below the 10th percentile.
Although welfare recipients appear to have increased their school
ing attainment between the time of first birth and 1989, close to onethird still had not completed high school. In comparison, only 11 per
cent of mothers who never were on welfare were high school dropouts
in 1989.
Mothers who were married at first birth were more likely to have
worked before their first birth, no doubt in part because they were older
when their first child was born. Mothers who were ever on welfare
worked less before their first birth than mothers who never went on
welfare, and they also worked considerably less during the ten-year
period preceding 1989. For example, a welfare mother whose child
was born out-of-wedlock worked 146 weeks over this period, only 45
percent as much as a married mother who was never on welfare.
The seemingly dismal qualifications of welfare recipients could be
viewed as evidence that their earning capacity is so low that welfare is
their only option. But low capacity may also be viewed as a conse
quence of a nexus of bad decisions. An early out-of-wedlock birth is
likely to interrupt schooling and detract from academic achievement,
while going on welfare or anticipating welfare may compound the
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effect. A low AFQT score may, therefore, signal low motivation or
other problems, including the cumulated effects of exposure to a wel
fare culture, rather than a pure lack of ability. The true explanation is
not readily apparent.
Nevertheless, there is another message in table 3.7 that offers some
optimism. Close to half of the unwed mothers with a first birth in 19781982, who subsequently went on welfare, were off the rolls in 1988
and 1989. On average, these mothers had been on AFDC for a total of
26 months since their first birth. Close to 92 percent worked in 1988 or
1989, and 53 percent were married (although an even higher number,
close to 70 percent, had been married at some time). Although the aca
demic attainment of this group was superior to that of the average per
son on welfare (three-fourths had completed high school), their mean
AFQT score was still quite low—in the 28th percentile. Yet, their aver
age family income was somewhat above $22,000 in 1989, a level equal
to 194 percent of the poverty line. 5 That average, however, disguises
some disparity associated with marital status: family income of those
who were married was $30,000; the income of those who were not
married was $14,700.
Those who started out as unwed mothers and were observed to be on
welfare in 1989 were recipients of welfare for about 72 months on
average since their first birth, a finding that suggests a large proportion
of the group was almost continuously on the program. Their average
AFQT score was only at the 18th percentile (40 percent scored below
the 10th percentile), and 44 percent of the group had never completed
high school. They also had more children than either married or
unmarried mothers who were not on welfare. Because they had been
on welfare for a long period, they were unlikely to have accumulated
extensive work experience. For all of these reasons they would have
been more likely to experience employment difficulties in 1989 than
those who had left welfare.
Unwed mothers who became long-term welfare recipients comprise
only a relatively small proportion (28.5 percent) of the cohort of
women who had a first birth in 1978-1982 and subsequently went on
welfare. Nonetheless, they dominate the AFDC caseload at any point in
time, and they are a group with multiple problems.
The work-related characteristics of NLSY women who were on
AFDC in 1989 are shown in table 3.8 and those of 1991 AFDC recipi-
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Table 3.8 Characteristics, Skills, and Work Experience of 24-31-Year-Old
Women on AFDC in 1989, by Years on Welfare since 1978
(NLSY)
On AFDC more than
2 years
All women On AFDC
on AFDC 2 years or
less
in 1989

On AFDC 4
years or
Total
more

39.1

25.6

42.7

44.0

9.5

6.7

10.2

11.1

51.4

67.8

47.2

44.9

17 or less

27.4

12.9

31.1

32.1

18 or 19

24.0

12.3

27.0

29.3

20 or more

47.8

71.9

41.6

38.3

% out-of-wedlock first birth

61.3

49.9

64.3

68.5

% southern, age 14

26.6

32.8

25.1

22.7

In year entered AFDC

1.385

1.562

1.342

1.286

In 1989

2.229

1.612

2.389

2.426

In year entered AFDC

43.2

27.3

47.5

49.5

In 1989

33.5

21.5

36.6

37.0

AFQT percentile (mean)

26.0

29.8

25.3

24.5

% at or below the 10th percentile

30.9

31.0

30.9

30.2

% went on AFDC within 2 years
of first birth

42.5

13.8

49.9

52.9

% worked before AFDC

76.2

85.6

73.8

72.2

Weeks worked by working
women before going on AFDC

140.5

293.7

98.2

44.3

Total months on AFDC since
1978 (mean)

57.4

10.0

69.1

75.6

1,123.2

231.7

891.4

765.4

530

87

443

393

% Black
% Hispanic
% white
Age at first birth (%)

Number of children

% high school dropout

Weighted population (OOOs)
Sample size

40

Table 3.9 Characteristics, Skills, and Work Experience of 26-33-Year-Old
Women on AFDC in 1991, by years on Welfare since 1978
(NLSY)
On AFDC more
than 2 years
AH women On AFDC 2
on AFDC
years
or less
in 1991

Total

On AFDC
4 years
or more

% Black

38.2

22.0

42.0

43.5

% Hispanic

9.7

7.6

10.2

10.2

% White

52.1

70.4

47.8

46.3

17 or less

30.4

13.1

34.3

35.4

18 or 19

20.9

16.1

22.0

22.3

20 or more

Age at first birth (%)

48.8

70.8

43.7

42.3

% out-of-wedlock first birth

56.5

45.1

59.1

61.5

% south, age 14

27.7

37.9

25.4

25.4

Number of children
In year entered AFDC

1.42

1.5

1.4

1.38

In 1991

2.35

1.68

2.5

2.55

In year entered AFDC

43.8

30.4

47.0

49.1

In 1991

34.9

30.4

36.0

37.1

AFQT percentile (mean)

22.2

24.3

21.7

21.4

% at or below the 10th
percentile

36.7

32.1

37.8

38.9

% went on AFDC within 2 years
of first birth

44.4

23.8

49.2

51.8

% worked before AFDC

62.9

78.9

59.1

56.6

Weeks worked by working
women before going on AFDC

115

253

92

79

Total months on AFDC since
1978 (mean)

66.4

10.3

80

85

Weighted population (OOOs)

1,274

243

1,033

930

Sample size

517

83

434

396

% high school dropout
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ents are shown in table 3.9. Both tables display characteristics of
women classified by duration on AFDC (total months in one or more
spells). To help inform consideration of a time limit, the classifications
refer to women who were on welfare for two years or less and to
women who were on welfare for more than two years and for four or
more years. Because the NLSY sample is composed of fixed birth
"cohorts," the information shown for 1989 (table 3.8) is limited to
women ages 24-31, while the data for 1991 refer to women ages 26-33
years (table 3.9). With the passage of time, those who are observed to
remain on welfare tend to become an increasingly more disadvantaged
group, since welfare recipients who have fewer disadvantages are more
easily employed (or married) and subsequently leave the program.
The difference between the characteristics of long-term participants
and those who had been on welfare two years or less is similar in both
1989 and 1991. We refer here to the 1991 profiles in table 3.9. In that
year, 81 percent of the caseload had been on AFDC for more than two
years (more than 24 months) and 73 percent for four years or more. On
average the four-year-and-over group had participated for about seven
years. More than half had gone on AFDC within 2 years of their first
birth, and more than 60 percent had borne their first child out of wed
lock. Their AFQT test scores put them at the bottom of the skill distri
bution, and although some had completed additional years of schooling
since first entering AFDC, 37 percent still had not completed high
school by 1991.
Those with less than two years on AFDC (with an average accumu
lation of only ten months on the caseload) in many ways had fewer
handicaps than long-term welfare recipients: They had worked 253
weeks on average before coming on AFDC and had fewer children (an
average of 1.7 versus 2.5). Yet their basic skills as measured by AFQT
scores and schooling are only somewhat better than those of the longterm recipients, It appears that, as the cohort ages, the proportion of
women going on AFDC for the first time declines, but at the same time,
those who do go on AFDC have fewer basic skills than those who
remain off the rolls.6 Future NLSY data will reveal whether the greater
work experience and smaller family size of these late entrants enable
them to leave welfare quickly or whether the negative effect of low
skills dominates and they remain, becoming long-term recipients.
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Work Outcomes of Former Welfare Recipients
A key issue in evaluating a program that imposes a time limit on
participation is the extent to which persons with the attributes of wel
fare recipients can actually become self-sufficient. Finding and keep
ing employment is one component of self-support; the other is the
wage rate of jobs obtained. The two are related, since work experience
and the skills acquired on the job have significant positive effects on
earnings (Mincer and Polachek 1974). Moreover, a woman who stays
on welfare long term will not only lose the experience she could have
gained while working, but may also find that skills acquired in school
or obtained from early work experience have eroded over time (Mincer
and Ofek 1982). For those reasons, women who leave welfare for work
are likely to earn less than women who were never on welfare in the
first place, even if they had similar schooling and AFQT scores. How
ever, if former recipients persist in the labor force, the gap between
their earnings and those of other workers never on welfare may narrow
over time.
In this section we examine the work participation and earnings of
former AFDC participants and compare them with those of other
women of the same age and schooling. As shown in table 3.10, former
welfare recipients (ages 27-34) who were off welfare in 1991 in fact
worked extensively. Despite their relatively low skills, their work par
ticipation almost equaled or exceeded that of other mothers never on
welfare—see table 3.7, columns (2) and (4), In table 3.10, only women
without children worked more, and this group not only is unencum
bered by child care concerns but also tends to be more highly educated.
Among all former welfare recipients in table 3.10, 81 percent worked
at some time in 1991; and of those who did work, 74 percent worked
full time, and 44 percent worked full time, year-round. Work participa
tion was lower for high school dropouts, but not dramatically so—71
percent of former recipients worked in 1991, and of these, one-third
worked full time and year-round. Among high school graduates, 84
percent of former recipients worked, 48 percent full time, year-round.
Among women who were still on welfare, about 44 percent reported
working, 30 percent for 26 weeks or more, but only 5 percent full time,
year-round. These are relatively low employment rates compared to

Table 3.10 Work Experience in 1991 of NLSY Women Ages 27-34 by Marital and Fertility Status, Welfare History,
and Education
With children3
Ever on AFDCa
All women

Without
children

Currently
married

Not currently
married

Total

OffAFDCin On AFDC in
1991
1991

All women
Sample size
Population (OOOs)

4,535

1,300

2,002

1,223

1,158

651

507

16,486

5,169

8,077

3,241

3,027

1,776

1,251

82.0

93.5

77.8

74.1

65.8

80.9

44.4

88.0

38.7

Working in 1991 (%)
Among workers, percent working
28 weeks or more

88.1

93.9

86.1

81.9

74.2

Full time

73.4

86.7

62.9

74.0

68.7

74.3

54.0

Full time, 50-52 weeks

52.0

67.4

42.7

45.1

33.0

43,7

5.3

Less than high school grad
Population (OOOs)

1,713

286

739

688

866

434

432

60.1

70.4

61.8

54.0

53.2

70.8

35.4

26 weeks or more

74.6

77.9

79.0

67.3

69.5

84.0

40.4

Full time

65.3

64.6

66.8

63.7

63.2

69.3

51.1

Full time, 50-52 weeks

31.4

45.3

31.8

23.3

23.5

32.7

Working in 1991 (%)
Among workers, percent working

5.1
(continued)

Table 3.10 (continued)
With children3
Ever on AFDCa
OffAFDCin On AFDC in
1991
1991

All women

Without
children

Currently
married

Not currently
married

Total

7,163

1,727

3,766

1,670

1,506

881

625

80.7

92.9

77.2

75.9

69.5

83.7

49.4

86.2

92.9

84.5

81.7

73.8

88.4

38.7
54.5

High school grad
Population (OOOs)
Working in 1991 (%)
Among workers, percent working
26 weeks or more
Full time

72.5

85.8

62.6

78.3

71.5

78.6

Full time, 50-52 weeks

50.0

65.7

42.0

48.4

35.3

48.0

5.0

3,957

1,251

2,001

705

586

415

171

86.4

94.8

81.2

86.2

74.1

84.3

49.3

26 weeks or more

90.5

93.7

88.7

8.8.9

79.6

89.6

38.0

Full time

72.4

84.6

64.0

71.1

67.1

70.2

54.5

Full time, 50-52 weeks

52.4

65.4

44.3

48.9

37.3

44.4

7.6

3,653

1,906

1,571

176

70

46

23

90.2

96.7

82.5

87.5

74.0

91.8

38.8

College, 1-3 years
Working in 199 1 (%)
Among workers, percent working

College grad
Population (OOOs)
Working in 1991 (%)

Among workers, percent working
26 weeks or more

93.3

93.7

88.8

91.8

81.8

95.4

17.8

Full time

78.6

84.6

61.0

85.0

72.8

70.8

82.2

Full time, 5052 weeks______61.4______65.4______45.9______56.0______37.0______44.8______0.0
a. Mothers who were never on welfare are not shown separately.
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those of the average mother, although they greatly exceed the figure of
6 or 7 percent reported to county welfare boards in recent years (see
table 2.2).
The annual earnings in 1991 and hourly wage rates in 1992 of
former and present welfare recipients and of other NLS Y women never
on welfare are given in tables 3.11 and 3.12, respectively. The former
recipients earned only $12,951, on average, during 1991 although
annual income rose to $16,372 if they worked full time, year-round.
These incomes are lower than the earnings of all married women with
children (both those ever on and those never on welfare), although the
difference narrows when the comparison is made within educational
groupings. Differences in annual earnings may arise because of differ
ences in the total time worked during the year (total hours worked may
vary even among full-time, year-round workers) and/or differences in
hourly wages. As indicated in table 3.12, the hourly pay of former wel
fare recipients averaged $7.43 in 1992, only 77 percent as much as
married mothers earned and 66 percent as much as women without
children. At the high school graduate level, former recipients' wage
rates averaged 90 percent of married women's wages. Current AFDC
recipients earn the lowest wages (even standardized for schooling).
Differences in hourly pay between former and current welfare recip
ients and other women could be attributable to differences in lifetime
work experience, since welfare recipients work much less than other
women. When employment is more sporadic, the jobs held are less
likely to provide on-the-job training and to build skills with an earnings
payoff later on. The lower AFQT skills of welfare recipients are also
likely to reduce their level of pay relative to nonrecipients, particularly
during recent years when the payoff from cognitive skills has increased
(O'Neill 1990b). Differences in geographic region and in the number
of children are other factors with a potential impact on pay differences.
To begin to understand the determinants of the wage rates that
former welfare recipients receive and that current recipients might
anticipate, we have conducted multivariate analyses of hourly wage
rates, the results of which are shown in tables 3.13 and 3.14. The main
findings of interest are as follows.
• In addition to the education and skill deficiencies of welfare recipi
ents already considered, former and current welfare recipients
worked 74 percent as many weeks as women never on welfare in

Table 3.11 Mean Annual Wage and Salary Income in 1991, NLSY Women Ages 27-34 in 1992, by Marital and
Fertility Status, Welfare History, and Education (in 1992 dollars)
Women with children3
Ever on AFDCa

All women

Women
without
children

All women

$18,867

$23,780

$16,727

H.S. dropout

10,881

16,674

H.S. graduate

15,189

Some college

Currently Not currently
married
married

Total

Off AFDC
in 1991

On AFDC
in 1991

$14058

$10,912

$12,951

$4,572

10,718

8,146

8,387

10,396

3,388

18,063

14,158

13,828

11,071

12,990

18,678
27,284

21,831

17,325

15,979

12,568

30,219

23,683

19,874

12,949

14,230
—

5,409
—

All women

$24,347

$22,919

$19,146

$16,043

$16,372

—

H.S. dropout

16,680

$27,240
—

14,982

12,127

13,699

14,494

—

H.S. graduate

19,836

21,121

19,735

17,862

15,636

15,871

—

Some college
College graduate

23,271

24,414

22,815

21,349

33,704

31,748

27,714

17,890
—

—

32,886

17,684
—

All workers

College graduate
Full-time year-round workers

NOTE: Incomes are not shown in cases with fewer than 25 individuals in the sample and are calculated only for women with earnings in 1991.
a. Earnings for women with children who were never on welfare are not shown.

—

—

Table 3.12 Hourly Rate of Pay in 1992, NLSY Women Ages 27-34 in 1992, by Marital and Fertility Status, Welfare
History, and Education
Women with children3
Ever on AFDCa

All women

Women
without
children

Currently
married

Not currently
married

Total

OffAFDC
in 1991

On AFDC
in 1991

$ 9.92

$11.20

$ 9.70

$ 7.86

$ 6.90

$7.43

$5.48

H.S. dropout

6.53

6.98

6.72

6.04

5.94

6.18

5.45

H.S. graduate

8.13

8.71

8.13

7.37

6.69

7.31

5.14

Some college

10.18

10.79

10.19

8.95

7.74

College graduate

13.79

14.04

13.72

11.43

10.71

8.32
—

5.38
—

All workers
All women

NOTE: Incomes are not shown in cases with fewer than 25 individuals in the sample and are calculated only for women with earnings in 1991.
a. Earnings for women with children who were never on welfare are not shown.

Table 3.13 Determinants of Log Hourly Wage Rate, Regression Results for NLSY Women with Children by Welfare
Participation over Their Lifetimes

Independent variables

Ever on welfare

Never on welfare

(1)

(2)

Coefficient

T-statistic

Coefficient

T-statistic

Variable means
Ever on
welfare

Never on
welfare

Intercept

1.5258

6.911

1.3264

9.724

1.000

1.000

Number of children

0.0037

0.245

-0.0183

-1.923

2.061

0.935

Age, 1990

-0.0070

-0.988

0.0001

0.020

29.209

29.095

Black

0.0574

1.326

0.0604

2.450

0.463

0.203

Hispanic

0.1484

2.741

0.1275

5.010

0.120

0.153

-0.1860

-5.263

-0.1012

-5.710

0.381

0.414

0.0830

2.337

0.0804

4.132

0.662

0.705

-0.0011

-0.120

-0.0169

-3.302

5.934

5.474

0-8 (omitted)
9-11

-0.0365

-0.466

-0.0501

-0.782

0.205

0.048

12

0.0112

0.148

-0.0146

-0.268

0.520

0.413

13-15

0.1191

1.421

0.0694

1.230

0.202

0.252

South
Urban and SMSA
Unemployment rate
(local labor market)
Schooling

Table 3.13 (continued)

(continued)

Independent variables
16+
Weeks worked
1986-90
1980-85
Worked full time
Ever armed forces
Currently married
Never married
AFQT percentile score
Adj. R-square
Mean, log hourly wage rate
Sample size

Ever on welfare
(1)
Coefficient
T-statistic
0.2288
1.839

Never on welfare
(2)
Coefficient
T-statistic
0.2672
4.587

Variable means
Ever on
welfare

Never on
welfare

0.028

0.262

0.0013

5.762

0.0018

11.367

148.900

212.406

0.0000

0.076

0.0004

3.256

102.517

194.635

0.0604

1.720

0.1203

5.555

0.734

0.799

0.0793

0.650

0.1212

1.574

0.016

0.012

0.0820

1.943

0.0278

1.276

0.381

0.584

0.0663

1.595

0.0230

0.826

0.343

0.141

0.0024

2.641

0.0035

8.266

26.529

46.298

0 .1751

0.2905

1 .7375

2.0878

742

2.807

Table 3.14 Determinants of Log Hourly Wage Rate, Regression Results for NLSY Women with Children
All women with children
(2)

(1)

Variable means

Coefficient

T-statistic

1.3863

T-statistic
9.622

1.3479

9.126

1.000

Number of children

-0.0597

-4.895

-0.0059

-0.501

Age, 1990

0.0265

5.603

0.0023

0.481

1.895
29.425

Black

0.0207

0.776

0.648

2.255

0.288

Hispanic

0.0418

1.347

0.1362

4.505

0.159

South

-0.1397

-6.186

-0.1262

-6.005

0.429

Urban and SMSA
Unemployment rate
(local labor market)

0.1011

4.257

0.0708

3.235

0.667

-0.0140

-2.315

-0.0121

-2.160

5.718

Ever on welfare

-0.2400

-9.950

-0.0671

-2.615

0.320

0-8 (omitted)
9-11

-0.0645

-1.106

0.109

12

-0.0102

-0.191

0.501

13-15

0.0831

1.441

0.232

Independent variables
Intercept

Coefficient

Schooling

(continued)

Table 3.14 (continued)
All women with children
(1)

Independent variables
16+
Weeks worked
1986-90
1980-85
Worked full time
Ever armed forces
Currently married
Never married
AFQT percentile score
Adj. R-square
Mean, log hourly wage rate
Sample size

Coefficient

(2)
T-statistic

0.2638

T-statistic
4.093

0.0015

9.576

185.100

0.0002

1.801

166.698

0.0898

4.037

0.725

0.0792

0.982

0.015

0.0421

1.294

0.653

0.0428

1.239

0.208

0.0029

5.470

37.600

Coefficient

0.1089

0.2532

1.9165

1.9165

2,192

2,192

Variable means
0.122
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the years 1986 through 1990 and 54 percent as many weeks in the
preceding period, 1980 through 1985.
•The payoff to additional schooling, particularly for schooling
beyond high school is similar for women who have been on wel
fare and women who have never been on welfare. The return to
higher AFQT scores is large and highly significant for both the
welfare and nonwelfare groups, but the effect is larger for those
who were never on welfare.
• The payoff to additional weeks worked in the 1986-1990 period is
large and significant for both groups, although somewhat greater
for those never on welfare. Additional work experience in the
1980-1985 period had no impact on later wages for women who
had been on welfare, although it had a positive and significant
effect (but smaller than for the later period) among those never on
welfare.
• When all women are combined in a single analysis, the net effect
of having been on welfare can be measured using a variable indi
cating welfare status. As shown in table 3.14, when we control for
no personal characteristics other than age, race and number of chil
dren, women ever on welfare are found to earn approximately 24
percent less than women who were never on welfare. After control
ling for the full array of variables including weeks worked over the
past few years, schooling, and AFQT score, the pay differential is
sharply reduced to around 7 percent.
These results are encouraging in some ways, since they suggest that
women with a welfare background who acquire skills and work experi
ence and are motivated to work can expect to get a significant payoff in
the market as a result of their efforts. Yet the gap in skills related to
years of schooling and academic achievement (as measured by AFQT
scores) may be extremely difficult to close. Moreover, the factors
responsible for welfare in the first place may not be easily reversed.
NOTES
1. The number of AFDC recipients appears to be underreported in the CPS, although the pat
tern of receipt by age and other characteristics appears to be very similar to that shown in other
data sources. See appendix A for further discussion.
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2. Since the table uses data from the NLSY, it is limited to women ages 14-22 in 1979. More
over, the observed durations are limited by the number of years covered by the survey, which at
present includes a potential maximum of fourteen years of welfare use.
3. The AFQT has a long history as a reliable indicator of skills and has been used by the
Armed Forces for years to determine eligibility for service.
4. Because the test was administered at the same point in time for all NLSY respondents, the
scores vary because of differences in age. The scores shown have been statistically adjusted for
age variation.
5. The poverty line used for this calculation is the average of the poverty lines for a two-child
family of three and a two-child family of four, since about half of the former recipients were mar
ried in 1989. Note that the NLSY definition of income includes the reported cash value of food
stamps received. However, food stamps were a minor portion of this group's income, adding an
average of only $170 to total income for the year.
6. The difference between recent entrants and long-term recipients is larger at younger ages.
See appendix table B.I for 1987 results when the cohort was ages 22-29. In that year, for example,
the mean AFQT score of those with two years or less on AFDC was 10 percentage points higher
than for those with longer-term participation.

CHAPTER

The Effectiveness of Education, Work,
and Training Programs for Reducing
Welfare Dependence
The idea that education, work, and training programs could be used
to improve the employability of welfare recipients has guided govern
ment efforts to move recipients off the welfare rolls since at least 1965,
when President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote:
Many recipients of public assistance are capable of training which
would ultimately make them self-supporting. I therefore urge the
Congress to make permanent the Unemployed Parent and Com
munity Work and Training Programs associated with the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and to require states
receiving federal support under AFDC to cooperate in making
Community Work and Training available for the unemployed par
ents of dependent children. (Economic Report of the President
1967).

In 1988, Congress reiterated these beliefs when it passed the Family
Support Act, which created the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) training program. As explained by a General Accounting
Office (GAO) report:
The (JOBS) program is intended to transform the nation's welfare
system b re-focusing the role it plays in helping families in pov
erty. JOBS requires states to provide parents and teens receiving
aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) the education,
training, work experience and supportive services they need to
move toward self-sufficiency and help avoid long-term welfare
dependence. JOBS embodies a new consensus that the well-being
of children depends not only on meeting their material needs but
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also on the parents' ability to become economically self-sufficient
(GAO 1991).

It is clear from these two quotes, over 20 years apart, that the policy
community has held to the belief that welfare recipients and their fami
lies can be made self-supporting if they are provided with appropriate
education, work, and training programs. But what has been the actual
impact of these programs on the work effort of participants and on the
size of the AFDC caseload? The preceding chapter showed that a sig
nificant fraction of AFDC mothers eventually leave the program.
Therefore, the question needing to be addressed concerns the extent to
which government programs have made a contribution to the outflow
that would not have occurred in their absence. Based on the review in
this chapter, the overall conclusion we reach is that these programs
have had minimal effects on welfare participation over time. The
observed flows off the AFDC program among participants in employ
ment and training programs do not appear to have been significantly
greater than for similar AFDC mothers who did not participate in such
programs.
This section provides an evaluative survey of the major employment
and training programs that have been applied to welfare recipients over
the past twenty-five years. An important caveat in interpreting the
results of this review is that all past programs took place in an environ
ment in which there was no limit on the time an otherwise eligible fam
ily could remain on welfare. In recent years, many AFDC recipients
have been required to participate in programs and were frequently sub
ject to the sanction of temporary partial benefit loss if they did not
comply. However, if a welfare recipient completed a program and then
was unable to become self-supporting, she could remain on welfare
indefinitely. Faced with a time limit, a recipient might well become
more motivated to succeed and therefore utilize her training and
employment opportunities more effectively than would have been the
case without a time limit. Our finding that the program did not enhance
the recipients' earnings rates or upgrade their occupations may have
been due partly to lack of motivation by the recipient. Thus, our nega
tive conclusions about the effectiveness of past programs may not nec
essarily apply to a situation where welfare recipients are faced with a
mandatory time limit.
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For purposes of this review, we group all education, work, and train
ing programs into three categories: (1) education and training services
aimed primarily at more mature women with school-age children; (2)
programs of education and special services designed especially for
teenage mothers who have recently entered AFDC; and (3) mandatory
"workfare" or work-experience programs. The first two categories con
tain programs that, for the most part, attempted to raise the labor mar
ket productivity of the AFDC participant through education, training,
and other supportive services. Programs in the third category operated
on two levels. First, they may have reduced the caseload by making
welfare less attractive, since the recipient was required to devote a sig
nificant portion of time to working at a specified location with no
increase in benefits. Second, they may have had positive effects on the
recipient's productivity in a manner similar to the programs in the first
two categories.

Education, Work, and Training Programs for Post-Teenage
Mothers
Following smaller efforts in the early 1960s, the Work Incentive
(WIN) program, established in 1967 became the first large-scale
employment and training program for AFDC recipients. When welfare
caseloads continued to rise, more stringent participation requirements
were added, and immediate job placement took precedence over train
ing for jobs (WIN II). At its height in 1975, WIN costs totaled about
$314 million, which is close to $900 million in today's dollars. But as
the high hopes for the program went unfulfilled, WIN funding was not
increased in line with inflation during the late 1970s.
An important change was made in the program under the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). This act authorized states
to conduct their own WIN demonstration projects as an alternative to
the standard WIN program. Community Work Experience Programs
(CWEP) were established, and many states tightened their work
requirements. Experience with these OBRA demonstration projects led
to the passage of legislation to establish the Family Support Act (FSA)
of 1988. The JOBS program, authorized by FSA and required to be
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implemented in all states by 1990, replaced WIN and stressed both
remedial and basic education, as well as training in job skills. JOBS
became the framework for providing training services to AFDC recipi
ents. Over the years, many program evaluations using various method
ologies have been conducted. One review of the many OBRA
demonstration projects evaluated by the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation (MDRC) concluded as follows: 1
The major finding of the MDRC studies is that welfare-to-work
programs usually produce the desired type of effects. In most
demonstrations, earnings and employment increased; frequently,
but not as dependably, welfare payments and welfare participation
declined. Typically, the magnitudes of these effects were quite
small, particularly regarding welfare receipt (O'Neill 1993).

We come to a similar conclusion after examining the evaluations of
four more recent employment and training demonstration projects
started under OBRA in the mid- and late 1980s. Table 4.1 provides a
description of the four programs—their sites, dates, and basic features.
Three of the projects—the Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM)
in San Diego, the Great Avenues for Independence Program (GAIN) in
six California counties, and Project Independence (PI) in nine Florida
counties—were mandatory for AFDC recipients with school-age chil
dren, with monetary sanctions applied for nonparticipation. The fourth
project—The Family Independence Plan (FIP) established in 15 coun
ties in Washington State—provided approximately the same range of
education, work, and training services as SWIM, GAIN, and Project
Independence. It differed from them in two significant ways, however:
(1) special monetary work incentives were built into the program, and
(2) no sanctions were applied for nonparticipation.
In the FIP program, participants assigned to an experimental group
received cash bonuses for enrolling in the services offered, such as
remedial schooling and/or a training program, and an even larger cash
bonus was provided if they took a paid job. Consequently, a FIP partic
ipant could work and receive, in earnings plus the FIP cash bonus, an
amount that would have disqualified her from welfare benefits under
the standard AFDC rules. FIP utilized increased marginal work incen
tives, an approach that had been removed from the AFDC program by
the 1981 OBRA Amendments noted above (see O'Neill 1993).

Table 4.1 Features of Four Recent Education-Training Programs

Name
Saturation Work Incentive
Model (SWIM)
Greater Avenues for
Independence (GAIN)

Location
San Diego

When
program
started

Period of
follow-up
evaluation

Mandatory
participation and
sanctions

Services
provided

July 1985 1985 to 1991

Yes

Job search, basic
education, training

6 counties in California,
including Los Angeles

1985

1989 to 1992

Yes

Job search, basic
education, training

Projected Independence (PI)

9 counties in Florida,
including Miami

1987

August 1991
to July 1992

Yes

Job search, basic
education, training,
JOB Club

Family Independence Plan
(FIP)

15 counties in
Washington State

1988

Education and
June 1990 to
No (positive
June 1992 financial incentive training
to participate)
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Two evaluations of the net impacts of FIP (Leigh 1993; Long and
Wissoker 1992) found that the program had the perverse effect of actu
ally increasing the welfare caseload. Two and three years after FIP
started in 1988, the rate of participation in AFDC was much higher
among FIP participants than among similar AFDC recipients who had
not participated in FIP. The AFDC mothers who did not participate in
FIP received no cash bonus for working, and their earnings were sub
ject to the official AFDC rules, which only allowed deductions for cer
tain work expenses and a time-limited income disregard (see above)
before reducing benefit amounts dollar for dollar. Thus, it appears that
incentives may increase rather than decrease welfare caseloads. (See
the discussion in chapter 2 and the analysis in chapter 5).
Unlike FIP, the SWIM and GAIN programs did not utilize earnings
disregards, and they provided for monetary sanctions (reduced AFDC
monthly benefit amounts) if an eligible recipient refused to participate.
SWIM provided job-search training for two weeks, followed by three
months in a work-experience program if no job was found during job
search. Those still unemployed after completing their work-experience
segment were assessed and referred to community education and train
ing programs. GAIN provided for initial testing and screening to find
those who might benefit from basic and remedial education. Those
who did not need basic education started in job-search training activi
ties and then proceeded through a cycle similar to the SWIM program.
SWIM and GAIN have undergone evaluations conducted by the
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). The
MDRC evaluations utilized the methodology of a controlled experi
ment in which individual recipients were assigned randomly to experi
mental and control groups (Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 1993;
Friedlander and Hamilton 1993). MDRC reported that GAIN and
SWIM had positive impacts, similar in magnitude to those found for
earlier programs operated under WIN and the early OBRA demonstra
tions.
These positive impacts included modest increases in annual earn
ings and modest reductions in AFDC benefit amounts, along with
smaller effects on rates of program participation. The increases in
annual earnings, however, (measured by the observed difference
between experimentals and controls) were almost entirely due to
increases in the amount of time worked during the year. No significant
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differences were found in earnings rates per quarter between experimentals and controls in either SWIM or GAIN. Thus, the programs
were unlikely to have had any impact on the long-term earnings capac
ity of the AFDC recipients who participated. This finding helps explain
why only very small effects were found with respect to welfare partici
pation. Larger reductions in program participation would have required
substantial impacts on the earnings rates, and probably on the occupa
tions, of the participants.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present information on the annual earnings and
quarterly earnings of experimentals and controls for the SWIM and
GAIN projects, as reported by the MDRC. It is clear from the tables
that in most comparisons the impact of either SWIM or GAIN on earn
ings rates (i.e. earnings per quarter of employment) were very small.
(In SWIM the effect on annual earnings declined sharply over time,
and the effect on earnings rates was as often negative as it was posi
tive.) Even the very large percentage increase in annual earnings in the
Riverside GAIN project was almost entirely due to increases in the
amount of time worked per year by the experimentals. The effects of
GAIN, it should be noted, varied widely among the six sites; in Los
Angeles and Tulare no positive impacts could be claimed.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present data comparing experimentals and con
trols with respect to rates of participation in AFDC. While SWIM and
GAIN appear to have reduced welfare participation, the effect was not
very large and appears to have narrowed with time in the program. If
we average over all the comparisons for all the quarters shown in
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we get a reduction of approximately 4 percentage
points. This is the amount by which the AFDC participation rate of
experimentals was less than that of the controls, on average. However,
by the last quarter shown, this effect was much diminished.
The Project Independence (PI) program was started in Florida in
1987 as its statewide welfare-to-work program. In 1988, after passage
of the Family Security Act, it became Florida's official JOBS program.
Like SWIM and GAIN, participation in PI was mandatory, with sanc
tions used to punish noncooperative behavior. Also like SWIM and
GAIN, PI provided job-search, occupational training, and basic educa
tion components. Each participant was assessed and either assigned
directly to job-search, or first to basic education or training and then to
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Table 4.2 Average Annual Earnings and Average Earnings per Quarter
Employed for Experimentals and Controls by Follow-Up
Period, Single-Parent Family Heads Only (SWIM Program)
Follow-up period

Experimentals

Controls

Percent difference

Average annual earnings3
Quarter5
2-5

$2,029

$1,678

21.0

6-9

2,892

2,248

28.6

10-13

3,287

2,732

20.3

14- 17

3,775

3,397

11.1

18-21

3.7
3,987
4,126
Average earnings per quarter employed

2-5

$1,536

$1,629

(-5.8)

6-9

2,056

2,012

10- 13

2,391

2,424

2.2
(-2.2)

14- 17

2,816

2,712

3.9

18-21

3,100

3,108

(-0.3)

SOURCE: Friedlander and Hamilton 1993.
a. All averages combine the earnings of those who worked with zeros for those who did not work.
If the average earnings per quarter are multiplied by four they equal what the average person who
did work would have earned if he had worked a full year.
b. Quarters after the random assignment month.
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Table 4.3 Average Annual Earnings and Average Earnings per Quarter
Employed for Experimentals and Controls by Follow-Up
Period, Single-Parent Family Heads (GAIN Program by
County Location)
Follow-up period
and county

Experimentals

Controls

Percent
difference

Average annual earnings

Alameda

Year!

$1,421

$1,212

17.2

Year 2

2,132

1,609

32.5

Average earnings per quarter employed

Yearl

$1,894

Year 2

2,479

Butte

$1,782

6.2

2,265
9.4
Average annual earnings

Yearl

$2,001

$1,729

15.7

Year 2

2,996

2,442

22.6

Average earnings per quarter employed

Yearl

$1,924

$1,746

10.1

Year 2

2,390

2,220

7.6

Los Angeles

Average annual earnings

Yearl

$1,304

$1,308

(-)O.l

Year 2

1,694

1,582

7.0

Average earnings per quarter employed

Yearl

$1,889

$2,404

(-)22.5

Year 2

2,258

2,361

(-)4.4

Average annual earnings

Riverside

Yearl

$2,470

$2,550

59.3

Year 2

3,414

2,234

52.8

Average earnings per quarter employed

Yearl

$843

$1,845

(-)0.2

Year 2

1,404

2,303

4.4
(continued)
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Table 4.3 (continued)
Follow-up period
and county

Experimentals

Percent
difference

Controls

Average annual earnings

San Diego
Yearl

$2,462

$2,113

16.5

Year 2

3,503

2,794

25.4

Average earnings per quarter employed
Yearl

$2,081

$2,031

(-)0.7

Year 2

2,654

2,494

6.4

Average annual earnings

Tulare
Yearl

$1,792

$1,941

(-)7.7

Year 2

2,532

2,498

1.4

Average earnings per quarter employed
Yearl

$1,792

$1,866

(-)4.0

Year 2

2,220

2,210

0.4

SOURCE: Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 1993.

Table 4.4 AFDC Participation by Follow-Up Period for Experimentals
and Controls, Single-Parent Families (SWIM Project)
Percent not receiving AFDC Benefits
Experimentals

Controls

Quarter
2-5

23.7

19.9

6-9

44.2

36.9

10-13

54.0

48.1

14-17

61.2

57.5

18-21

65.9

63.9

Follow-up period3

SOURCE: Friedlander and Hamilton 1993.
a. Quarters after random assignment to program.

Table 4.5 Receipt Status, by Follow-Up Period, for Experimentals and Controls, Single-Parent-Families, GAIN
Project by County Location (percent still on AFDC)
Followup
period3

Alameda

Butte

Los Angeles

Riverside

San Diego

Tulare

Exp.

Cont.

Exp.

Cont.

Exp.

Cont.

Exp.

Cont.

Exp.

Cont.

Exp.

Cont.

2

97.0

98.0

88.6

89.4

95.7

95.5

89.4

89.2

94.1

94.7

94.3

93.6

3

94.1

94.8

79.8

76.4

91.8

94.6

75.8

79.6

83.3

85.6

87.0

86.7

4

89.8

91.3

70.7

70.6

88.9

91.6

66.1

72.6

74.8

77.9

81.0

81.0

5

86.0

89.2

65.0

68.4

84.8

88.0

58.7

65.9

69.1

72.1

76.7

75.0

6

83.3

86.8

60.8

63.8

81.8

85.7

54.7

61.1

63.9

67.5

72.3

71.6

7

82.3

83.5

56.2

56.7

79.0

82.5

51.8

57.0

60.3

65.7

68.5

68.7

8

78.8

79.9

51.9

52.7

76.8

79.5

49.1

55.1

58.3

63.7

66.2

64.4

9
10

76.6

77.1

49.4

47.4

74.0

76.3

46.7

52.0

56.0

61.1

65.4

62.2

46.8

48.6

71.5

74.1

45.0

50.4

53.8

58.0

43.2

45.3

69.6

71.2

43.1

49.5

52.2

55.6

50.4

53.9

Quarter

11
12

SOURCE: Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman 1993.
a. Quarters after random assignment to program.
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job-search. During the 1990-1991 period, the average participation in
PI was eight months.
PI underwent a comprehensive evaluation by MDRC (Kemple and
Haimson 1994). Table 4.6 summarizes the main findings on program
impacts one year after recipients were randomly assigned to the pro
gram. The results are very similar to those found in GAIN and SWIM
at the same follow-up point—that is, some positive effects that are
nonetheless small and may be found to be transitory. If the general
magnitude of the caseload effect shown for the GAIN, SWIM, and PI
programs is taken at face value, the reduction in the AFDC caseload
implied by an effect of this magnitude is about 3 percent if all AFDC
recipients are put through the program.
Table 4.6 First Year Impacts on Average Earnings of Those Who Worked
and AFDC Participation (Project Independence)
Outcome and
follow-up period Program group

Percentage
Control Group___difference

Average earnings ($)
Quarter 2

507

484

4.7

3

642

579

10.9

4

678

648

4.6

5

713

673

5.9

Quarter 2
3
4
5

Average earnings of those
who worked
1,432
1,389
1,725

O3.1
3.4

1,852

1,668
1,857

(-)10.3

1,953

1,962

(-)10.5

AFDC participation (percent
Quarter 2

79.6

81.7

2.6

3

72.2

76.3

5.4

4

66.7

71.6

6.8

5

64.3

68.6

6.3

SOURCE: Kemple and Haimson 1994.
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However, this calculation assumes that all AFDC mothers could
benefit from a SWIM-, GAIN-, or Pi-type program in the same way as
AFDC mothers in the experimental groups, which is very unlikely.
Moreover, as we discuss below, the impact evaluation methodology
used by MDRC assigns credit to the program's services for any case
load-reducing effect that is due solely to the mandatory aspect of the
program.2 Thus, if a recipient who is working "off the books" leaves
AFDC when she is mandated to participate in the training program, she
would be counted by MDRC as benefiting from the program's services.
This practice may overstate the effect of the program services them
selves in reducing welfare participation. To the extent that some por
tion of the observed caseload reduction is due to this "mandatory
assignment" effect, it would mean that education and training services
by themselves had less impact on aggregate caseload reductions,
although the exact amount of impact cannot be discerned from the
evaluations conducted.
In sum, the provision of employment and training programs, even in
their most recent manifestations (FIP, SWIM, GAIN, and PI), appears
to have had only a small impact on reductions in welfare dependence.
Whether these programs would be more effective if combined with a
two-year limit is an open question.

Education and Other Services Especially for Teenage Mothers
Our longitudinal analysis (chapter 3) indicated that teenagers who
bear a child out-of- wedlock have a very high probability of going on
welfare and of becoming long-term welfare recipients. Therefore,
interest is particularly high in focusing services on this group of wel
fare mothers. They were one of three special target groups identified by
Congress in the JOBS program legislation.3
Most of the programs designed for teenage welfare mothers have
aimed to get dropouts back to school (or to help those who did not drop
out to stay in school) with the hope that they would eventually graduate
with a high school diploma or GED. The individual recipient was typi
cally assigned to a case manager, whose job was to help the young girl
succeed in fulfilling the goals of the program. In addition to high
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school graduation, these goals usually included birth control counsel
ing, instruction in the care of her child, personal skills development,
and introduction to the world of work. Usually local public facilities
were utilized for these additional service elements.
Programs of this type have been provided as large demonstration
projects under WIN and OBRA, as well as parts of ongoing social wel
fare programs mainly funded by state and local governments. For
example, in New York State a caseworker program has tried to reach all
teenagers who gave birth and registered with the AFDC program,
either as "case heads" or as dependent teen parents.
Two important programs started in the early and mid-1980s—
Project Redirection and the Teenage Parent Demonstration Project—
have been the subject of evaluation studies that measure program
impacts several years after participants have left the program. Other
important programs aimed at young AFDC mothers have been Ohio's
Learning, Earning and Parenting Program (LEAP) and the New
Chance program evaluated by MDRC (see table 4.7). The LEAP and
New Chance programs are more recent and have not yet been subject
to comprehensive postprogram outcome evaluations.
Project Redirection

This project was begun in 1980 under the auspices of the Ford Foun
dation and the WIN program. It operated from 1980 through 1982 and
served about 800 teen mothers at four program sites in Boston, New
York City, Phoenix, and Riverside, California. About 72 percent of the
participating mothers were receiving AFDC benefits when they began
the program, and the average participant stayed in the program for
about one year. A nonexperimental comparison group was selected by
sampling poor teenage mothers in other similar locales with approxi
mately the same set of personal characteristic as the girls in the Project
Redirection program. The MDRC analysis shows that the comparison
group of girls did receive some services that were similar to those
offered by Project Redirection, but not in the same quantities (Polit,
Quint and Riccio 1988).
Impact surveys were conducted two years and five years after partic
ipants had begun the Project Redirection program; members of the
comparison group were also followed-up over the same time period.

Table 4.7 Special Programs for Teenage Mothers in AFDC
Time period
of program

Time period
of follow-up

Mandatory
participation
and sanctions

Services provided

Program

Location

Project Redirection

Four sites: Boston,
NYC, Phoenix, and
Riverside, CA

1980 - 1982

1982 - 1985

No

Case managei", secondary
education, special classes in
birth control, child care, life
problems, etc.

Teenage Parent
Demonstration
Project (TPDP)

Camden and Newark,
NJ and Chicago

1987 - 1991

1989 - 1993

Yes

Case manager, secondary
education. Workshops in
personal skills, child
support, family planning,
health and nutrition, life
skills, etc.

Learning, Earning
and Parenting
Program (LEAP)

Ohio (statewide)

1989 - on-going

1980 - 1994

Yes

Case manager, secondary
education

New Chance

Nationwide
Selected cities: 16
locations in 10 states

1989-1991

1991-1993

No

Case manager, secondary
education. Health-related
services, services to benefit
children of teen mothers,
employment-related
services.
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Since the average length of stay in Project Redirection was one year,
follow-up information was generally gathered from one to four years
after program termination.
Four main outcomes are reported for both the Project Redirection
participants and the comparison group: educational attainment,
employment, welfare dependence, and subsequent pregnancies and live
births. With respect to educational attainment and employment, no sig
nificant differences were found between participants and the compari
son group. The results for welfare dependence were puzzling. At the
two-year follow-up point, Project Redirection participants had an
AFDC participation rate 7 percentage points above that of comparison
group members (75 percent vs. 68 percent). But at the five-year point,
the difference reversed and Project Redirection participants showed a
lower rate of participation than the comparison group—49 percent vs.
59 percent. Finally, with regard to subsequent fertility, the five-year
follow-up reveals the same mean number of subsequent pregnancies
(about 3) for both groups, but more abortions were reported for the
comparison group. Thus, the Project Redirection group had more live
births over the four-year postprogram follow-up period than the com
parison group members.
Teenage Parent Demonstration Project (TPDP)

TPDP was evaluated by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (Maynard 1993). The TPDP was a large demonstration project operated at
three sites—Camden and Newark in New Jersey, and Chicago, Illi
nois—from late 1987 to mid-1991.
During this period, about 6,000 teenage mothers joined the welfare
rolls, and about 90 percent of them were chosen to participate in the
experiment. They were randomly assigned to be in the demonstration
program or in a control group that only received regular AFDC pro
gram services. Unlike Project Redirection, which paid participants a
$30 a month bonus just for participating, TPDP had negative sanctions
in the form of reduced AFDC payment if they refused to participate in
the program altogether, or if they did not keep up with their assigned
activities after enrolling (e.g., school attendance).
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The cornerstone of TPDP, like Project Redirection, was the provi
sion of multiple services and the use of individual case management.
As explained by the Mathematica evaluators:
Case managers helped participants decide what education or train
ing to pursue, found open slots in appropriate programs, coaxed
and pressured the young mothers to stick to their plans, and coun
seled them when crises arose. If the teenage parents persistently
failed to participate in planned activities, case managers initiated
sanctions, consisting of reductions in AFDC grants by the amount
normally allocated to cover the needs of the mother—generally
$160 in New Jersey and $166 in Chicago—which remained effec
tive until the young mothers complied with the participation
requirements.
All three demonstration programs required participants to attend a
set of initial workshops designed to enhance their personal skills,
convey information that would help them cope with their new
responsibilities, and prepare them for education, training, and
employment activities. Workshop topics included, child support,
family planning, health and nutrition, life skills, family manage
ment, motivation, parenting, employment preparation, education
preparation, and HIV and drug abuse prevention.
To help participants move toward self-sufficiency, the demonstra
tion programs promoted participation in education, job training,
and/or employment, relying heavily on existing community ser
vices. However, they also developed some in-house services,
using both their own staff and staff from other agencies. All three
programs offered child care and transportation assistance to
address these barriers to program participation (Maynard 1993,
pp. 5 and 7).

The outcomes of TPDP that are available at this time refer to a
period that averages 28 months after program intake for all partici
pants. Participation in TPDP was open-ended—as long as the teenage
mother remained on AFDC. One program outcome measured was the
rate at which participants left AFDC. Table 4.8 compares the experimentals and controls on this outcome. The results are similar to what
was observed in the GAIN and SWIM program evaluations—a definite
lowering of participation, but by only a small amount.

Table 4.8 Outcomes of TPDP for Experimentals and Controls by Site of Project
Average number of pregnancies and
Site___Percent participating in AFDC_____________live births per participant___________
Pregnancies

Live births

Experimentals

Control

Experimentals

Control

Experimentals

Control

Camden

78.1

79.8

0.9

1.0

0.6

0.6

Newark

84.4

85.5

1.0

0.9

0.4

0.4

Chicago

75.5

79.2

1.0

1.0

0.8

0.7

SOURCE: Maynard 1993.
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Another important outcome measure is fertility behavior. The out
come for TPDP was the same as for Project Redirection. Table 4.8 con
tains the measures on this outcome for experimentals and controls. The
results show both a slightly greater number of pregnancies and live
births among experimentals than among controls.
LEAP and New Chance Programs

Some results from Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting Pro
gram have been presented in an interim MDRC follow-up evaluation
(Bloom, Fellerath, Long, and Woods 1993). Preliminary results have
been made available from a small and informal follow-up of 50 partici
pants in the New Chance program (Quint, Fink, and Rowser 1993;
Quint, Musick, and Ladner 1994). The results from these two prelimi
nary examinations are not as reliable as MDRC's comprehensive
experimental evaluations, but they are suggestive of what the compre
hensive follow-up is likely to find.
Each of these programs is similar to one of the two programs for
teen mothers described above. New Chance is very similar in spirit and
approach to Project Redirection. Participation was voluntary in both
programs (i.e., no sanctions were used either to compel initial partici
pation or to continue participation), and positive reenforcement incen
tives (e.g., better grades in high school led to accumulation of "stamps"
that could be traded in for clothing, toys, movies, etc.) were used in
both programs as part of a protective and caring environment for the
young mothers. In addition, both programs stressed the role of a case
manager as a caring adult advisor. Finally, both programs provided sig
nificant services and treatments in addition to requirements for high
school attendance.
Ohio's LEAP program is similar to the TPDP in that the program
participation of young AFDC mothers was mandatory, and penalties
were imposed for unsatisfactory participation. On the other hand,
LEAP differed from TPDP in that the only major service component
was an education program requiring that participants attend high
school until a degree was obtained. Employment-related training or
courses in health and personal development were not a part of LEAP.
LEAP used quite large monetary incentives, both positive and nega
tive, to keep the young mothers attending school. Each LEAP partici-
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pant received a bonus of $62 for enrolling in school on time. For each
subsequent month that she satisfied the program's attendance require
ments, she received an additional $62 per month. The average teen
mother in the AFDC program in 1990 received a regular monthly
AFDC cash benefit of $274, so the monthly bonus of $62 represented
an increase of 22 percent over the base level. In contrast, enrolling late
for school resulted in a loss of $62, and unsatisfactory attendance in
any month reduced the monthly welfare payment by $62. Thus, the
total difference in monthly benefits between a teen mother who satis
factorily attended school and one who did not was $124 (=$336-$212).
This clearly represents a significant pecuniary incentive for teen moth
ers in the program to satisfy the attendance requirements of LEAP. It is
important to note that the attendance requirement in LEAP was not
related to any measures of performance in school, such as maintaining
a particular grade point average. Rather, it was a simple requirement of
physical presence.
A short-run follow-up of early enrollees in LEAP shows that they
had better attendance records in high school than the control group of
teen mothers who did not receive either the LEAP bonus or penalty.
This effect was also found in the evaluation of the TPDP program, in
which experimentals attended school in more months than did control
group members during the follow-up period. Recall that the TPDP also
provided for very large pecuniary penalties for nonparticipation of
experimentals.
MDRC followed and interviewed fifty girls (out of a total of 1,550
girls who participated in New Chance during 1989-1992). They found
thirty-six who had obtained the program's principal short-term objec
tive, a GED certificate, by the time they left the program, while sixteen
girls had left without obtaining the GED.4 On average, the fifty girls
interviewed had been out of the New Chance program for about 30
months at the time of the interview.
Of the thirty-four mothers who had obtained a GED in the New
Chance program, the study found that twenty-nine (83 percent) had
participated in some kind of postsecondary education and training
since obtaining their GED, and twenty-two (65 percent) had worked
for some time during their base period. However, at the time of the
interview, twenty-five of these mothers (73 percent) were still receiv
ing AFDC benefits. Further, among the sixteen mothers who had not

Lessons for Welfare Reform 75

obtained a GED, the study found that all of them were either still in the
AFDC program or applying to reenter the program at the time of the
interview. Finally, MDRC reports the unfortunately familiar and dis
couraging finding with regard to subsequent pregnancy—of the thirtyfour who obtained their GED, nineteen had become pregnant during
the period since obtaining their GED and eleven of these pregnancies
resulted in live births.5 The evaluations of the TPDP and Project Redi
rection Programs both showed that, in spite of gains on some outcome
measures, there were no significant differences between experimentals
and controls on subsequent pregnancies and only a small reduction in
the rate of AFDC participation.
Given the importance of young mothers in any welfare reform, it is
important to develop alternative approaches for reducing their welfare
dependence. Clearly, the best way for this population to escape welfare
dependency is to avoid having an out-of-wedlock birth in the first
place. Unfortunately little is known about how government can go
about influencing the fertility behavior of young girls. There has been
much discussion of sex education and condom distribution as ways of
reducing out-of-wedlock birth. It is not at all clear, however, that igno
rance about contraceptive devices is a principal cause of teenage childbearing and subsequent welfare dependence.
Little empirical analysis is available about work and training pro
grams that have served teenage girls from the inner-city before they
had a child. However, a recent evaluation of the JOBSTART demon
stration program (Case et al. 1993) provides evidence suggesting that if
young disadvantaged girls can be reached before they have a baby, the
probability that they will subsequently go on welfare may be signifi
cantly reduced.
The JOBSTART demonstration, implemented between 1985 and
1988, was not directly related to teen pregnancy or the AFDC program.
Economically disadvantaged school dropouts age 17 to 21 with poor
reading skills participated in education and vocational training and
received support services and job placement assistance. Participation in
JOBSTART was strictly voluntary, and the program was intended to
increase the educational attainment and job prospects of the participat
ing youth.
Although the impact of JOBSTART on earnings outcomes was dis
appointing, the study did find that AFDC recipiency was significantly
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lower among the female experimentals who were not custodial mothers
at the time they entered JOB START. For example, four years after
entering the program, 39 percent of the noncustodial girls in the con
trol group were in the AFDC program, while only 31 percent of the
corresponding experimental group were. Thus, JOBSTART participa
tion reduced welfare participation by almost 10 percentage points.
Among girls who were already custodial mothers when they entered
JOBSTART, there was no significant difference in AFDC participation
rates between experimentals and controls two years after entry into the
program (59.3 percent for experimentals vs. 60.5 percent for controls).
The issue of prevention is clearly one that requires more attention than
it has received thus far.

Workfare
Another approach to reducing welfare dependency, although widely
referred to in the media, is probably the least well defined. To many
analysts, the term "workfare" applies to any program for reducing wel
fare dependency that is mandatory for AFDC recipients. Thus, the
GAIN, SWIM, and PI programs described above, all of which were
mandatory for certain subgroups of AFDC recipients, have sometimes
been referred to as workfare programs. Indeed, the newly created fed
eral-state JOBS program is often called in its entirety a workfare pro
gram.
Nevertheless, the term workfare has also been applied to a specific
kind of program in which welfare recipients were mandated to perform
a particular job for a specified number of hours per week in return for
welfare benefits. Formal training and education services have not usu
ally been provided in these programs, and the skill demands of the
work have usually been modest. Jobs have been located either in local
government agencies or nonprofit organizations, and they could be per
formed by the recipients with a minimum of informal on-the-job train
ing.
One major objective of this approach—call it "pure" workfare—has
been to reduce welfare dependency by reducing the real benefits of
welfare; and this has been accomplished by" assigning a work require-
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ment to the receipt of welfare benefits. Thus, the work requirement was
expected both to deter individuals from enrolling in AFDC, as well as
to encourage earlier exits than otherwise would be likely to occur.
In addition, proponents of pure workfare argue that this approach
has the potential for providing some valuable services to the commu
nity as recipients work for their AFDC benefits. Some observers also
have commented that the work experience itself could improve recipi
ents' chances of obtaining a better job in either the private or public
sector.6
What is the role in the current welfare situation for the pure workfare approach? Is there empirical evidence on its effectiveness in
reducing welfare dependence? And what subgroups of the welfare pop
ulation can it most effectively serve?
Workfare has operated most directly and quickly on those welfare
recipients who have fairly good earnings' prospects, including single
adults covered by local and state welfare programs (ineligible for fed
eral funding). For those recipients, the value of being on welfare drops
sharply when they are mandated to participate in workfare. For recipi
ent groups with low outside earnings prospects relative to benefit lev
els, including teenage mothers, workfare has been much less likely to
have an immediate effect on welfare participation. Although workfare
has reduced the net benefit from being on AFDC, recipients would earn
little if they went off welfare, so they have tended to remain. Neverthe
less, it is possible that in the long run, teenage girls would be deterred
by a workfare requirement from having an out-of-wedlock birth in the
first place, and would be more motivated to stay in school and enhance
their potential earnings.
Chart 4.1 illustrates the impact a workfare program would have on
the real gain from welfare and how the situation would differ for highwage and low-wage welfare recipients. That chart provides a standard
economic utility analysis of the individual's choice between leisure
time ("discretionary time" is perhaps a better term) and money income.
The cash benefit amount is OM. Without a pure workfare program, the
individual on welfare would receive this benefit without any loss of lei
sure time, as indicated by Point 1. With a workfare program, the indi
vidual could be at Point 2, where she would still receive the benefit of
OM but would have to work PQ hours per week, losing that much in
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leisure time. Point 1 is clearly preferable to Point 2—that is, pure
workfare has reduced the attractiveness of welfare.
But will the welfare recipient leave (or not come on) the program
with pure workfare in effect? The answer depends in part on the recipi
ent's potential earnings opportunities off welfare. Two leisure income
trade-off lines are shown on the chart. That shown for Recipient A is
steeper than that shown for Recipient B, indicating a higher potential
wage rate for Recipient A. Recipient A has the option of taking the lei
sure income bundle available on welfare with pure workfare (Point 2).
But if she spends the hours required by workfare (PQ) at a private sec
tor job, she can attain a higher money income than OM (Point 3). Thus,
she would be likely to leave (or fail to come on) welfare when pure
workfare is present.
Chart 4.1 Analysis of the Impact of Workfare on the Incentive
to be on Welfare
Money income
($)

M
Welfare
benefit <
amount

(with workfare)

(without Leisure time
workfare) (hours)

Recipient B, on the other hand, has an earnings capacity less than
that of A. Her market earnings from the required PQ hours would put
her at Point 4, less than the welfare grant of OM. Consequently, she
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would not be likely to leave welfare after pure workfare is put in place.
A large fraction of welfare recipients are likely to resemble Recipient
B.
Little empirical evidence is available concerning the magnitude of
the effect of pure workfare on welfare participation. Research has been
conducted on one large-scale application of something close to pure
workfare conducted in Ohio in the 1980s, and some inferences about
workfare can also be drawn from some mandatory educational and
training programs.
The Ohio program was evaluated by Schiller and Brasher (1993),
who report significant and large impacts of workfare on the AFDC
caseload in Ohio. Schiller and Brasher compared AFDC caseloads in
Ohio counties that implemented workfare with those that did not. As
chart 4.2 shows, the divergence between n experimental and control
counties is quite dramatic for the single-parent caseload. Schiller and
Brasher applied multiple regression techniques to control for possible
factors other than the workfare program that might differ between
experimental and control counties. The sizable impact of workfare
remained largely intact. The Schiller and Brasher study has been sub
ject of a critical assessment that casts some doubt on the reliability of
its findings. Although these criticisms weaken the reliability of the
magnitude of the caseload-reducing effect of workfare, they do not
appear to negate the finding that a positive and significant effect was
present in the Ohio program.7
Some additional indirect empirical evidence on the effect of manda
tory workfare on welfare caseloads can be obtained from the evalua
tions of some of the education and training programs discussed above,
as well as from some mandatory partial workfare programs that were
tried in the early and mid-1980s under OBRA.
Three of the programs discussed above—GAIN, SWIM, and PI—
were mandatory for any AFDC recipients who were assigned to them.
Thus, for recipients who either had a good job prospect or were work
ing "off-the-books," a mandate to participate in a program like GAIN
may have been similar to a mandate to participate in a pure workfare
program.8 One would either lose leisure time or no longer be able to
work at an unreported outside job and at the same time collect welfare
benefits.
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Chart 4.2 Impact Analysis of Ohio©s Workplace Program AFDC (Single
Parent) Caseload Trends
% Change in AFDC-U Caseload from 1981:1
120

1234123412341234123412341234
1981

| 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987
Time

-••60 non-CWEP counties +20 applicant counties 3ta pilot CWEP counties

SOURCE: Schiller and Brasher 1993, figure 2.

Table 4.9 shows, for those participants in the three recent programs
surveyed and two OBRA workfare programs who were assigned to the
experimental group, the percent who left the program without receiv
ing any of the services (or performing any of the workfare assignment)
Table 4.9 Percentage of Experimental Group Who Obtained No Services
from Their Program
Program
GAIN
SWIM
Project Independence
San Diego WEP
Cook County WEP

Percent
46
31
57
54
52

provided by the program. In each program (except perhaps for SWIM),
large percentages of AFDC recipients who were assigned to the experi-
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mental group (i.e. those who must show up for program activities) left
the program without participating at all. Why would such large propor
tions leave a mandated program assignment for which they would be
sanctioned with reduced benefits? The researchers conducting the eval
uation studies made some effort to find out what had happened to these
recipients.
The authors of the GAIN study (Friedlander, Riccio, and Freedman
1993) report as follows:
While a substantial portion of the orientation attenders—ranging
from 37 to 57 percent—did not participate in a GAIN activity,
almost all of the nonparticipants were people who were not
required to participate in GAIN activities by the end of the followup period. The vast majority (80 to 100 percent) of the nonpartici
pants were either no longer enrolled in the program (i.e., they
were "deregistered") because they had gotten a full-time job, left
welfare, were sanctioned or met other specific criteria, or were
temporarily excused from participating because of part-time
employment, illness, or other reasons (i.e., they were officially
"deferred") (p. 221).

In the PI study (Kemple and Haimson 1994), it is reported that:
It is not clear how many of those who did not attend orientation
left the program because they found a job or because they left the
AFDC rolls. In all, However, 70 percent of those who did not
attend orientation were employed at some point during the followup period, and 66 percent were employed during either the quarter
in which they were randomly assigned or the following quarter (p.
60).

If is clear that large numbers of those who immediately left the man
dated assignment also left AFDC, the hypothesized effect of workfare
on the welfare caseload. However, as the researchers all pointed out, it
is not possible to know how much of the exit from AFDC was caused
by the mandated assignment and how much reflects ongoing caseload
turnover unrelated to the mandated assignment.
In sum, workfare, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, may be
capable of reducing welfare caseloads. However, the empirical evi
dence is scanty and much further research is needed. The recently
passed welfare reform bill requires, in effect, a form of workfare for all
participants who reach their two-year limits and can no longer receive
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welfare benefits without spending some time in a work activity (see
chapter 1). Should workfare be applied at an earlier point? Mothers
whose children are already in school and who are likely to have rela
tively good job prospects could be a target group for mandatory workfare. Whether or not workfare should be applied to recipients with pre
school-aged children before they reach their two-year limit or even at
the two-year limit is a more complex question since it involves the
potentially large costs of childcare.

Summary
As noted at the beginning of the chapter we feel that our survey indi
cates that even the most recently conceived education and training pro
grams, and especially those targeted at young teenage mothers, have
simply not been effective in raising their earnings capacity, reducing
fertility, or reducing the welfare caseload. However, it is possible that
combined with a strictly enforced time limit, the education and training
programs might have a significant positive effect in reducing welfare
caseloads. State welfare administrators should be encouraged to pursue
follow-up evaluations of education and training programs operated
with the time limit in place.
The general workfare approach (including initiatives that are imbed
ded in mandatory education and training programs) may be capable of
some significant reductions in the welfare caseload, but the empirical
evidence is still somewhat thin.
The results for the special programs aimed at teenage AFDC moth
ers were particularly discouraging and suggest that the emphasis of
policy should shift toward the objective of reducing teenage pregnan
cies.
NOTES
1. Similar findings were reached in evaluations of the traditional WIN programs which pre
ceded the OBRA demonstration projects using statistical evaluation methodologies (Ketron Inc.
1980; Grossman, Maynard, and Roberts 1985).
2. Carol Romero (1994, Appendix A) comes to a similar conclusion about MDRC methodol
ogy.
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3. In 1993, the GAO found that about 24 percent of teenage mothers on AFDC in 1992 had
been served by JOBS, which started in most states in 1990 (GAO 1993).
4. This was not a random sample. Program data show that for all 1,550 New Chance partici
pants, about 24 percent had obtained a GED by the time they left the program.
5. MDRC has released some interim findings on New Chance based on their usual experimen
tal/control group methodology. It reports on girls who had enrolled in the program 18 months
before. Their findings are similar to what was reported in the informal follow-up study—no differ
ence in subsequent fertility behavior or welfare participation between experimentals and controls
("New Chance: Interim Findings" Confidential Release, MDRC, June 9, 1994).
6. Based on discussions with Kathy Zall, former director of Employment and Training Pro
grams, Human Resources Administration, New York City. Also Betsy Gotbaum, former commis
sioner, New York City Parks and Recreation, reported successfully recruiting good employees for
regular jobs in her agency from among welfare recipients who had been assigned to the Parks
Department under a workfare program mandated by the city for its Home Relief recipients.
(Home Relief is a state and locally funded welfare program for single individuals.)
7. The critical assessment alluded to was written by Ralph Smith of the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), who reviewed the Schiller-Brasher study when it first appeared in 1988 (internal
memo—copy available on request). Smith's criticism notes that there were only eight experimen
tal counties (vs. 80 nonexperimental counties) and the experimentals may have been subject to
special factors not controlled for in the multiple regression analysis. For example, these eight
counties may have been trending down in terms of their AFDC caseloads before the experiment
began.
8. It is not identical because there is the opportunity of joining an education or training pro
gram (some areas offer college education opportunities). If the participant puts some value on
these opportunities, she may not leave

CHAPTER

Administrative and Incentive Changes
Under the Jobs Program
What Did They Do for Welfare Reform?
In 1988 the JOBS program had been hailed as an approach that
would reduce welfare dependency both by providing the education and
training services described above and by changing the way welfare
programs were administered. Under JOBS, the AFDC program was to
have become a vehicle for developing the work motivation and skills of
clients, rather than a system for determining eligibility and dispensing
checks. Moreover, states were encouraged to experiment with changes
in the rules and incentives of their AFDC programs to see if they could
reduce welfare dependency. Under the new welfare legislation, states
will have the freedom to continue the experiments started under JOBS
as well as to develop additional changes in rules and incentives.
Did the JOBS framework actually provide these kinds of changes in
the administration of the AFDC program? Has the state waiver pro
gram led to experiments that have resulted, or are likely to result, in a
reduced welfare caseload? We examine some evidence on each of these
questions. 1

Administrative Objectives Under JOBS
Here we examine two kinds of indirect evidence: types of services
provided and recipients served, and overall coverage and utilization of
JOBS services by the AFDC population.
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Types of Services Provided and Recipients Served

Table 5.1 shows that in FY91 most of the participants in the JOBS
program were in a formal education program (elementary, secondary
or postsecondary) or in a formal training program. There was little use
of any program element resembling workfare, such as Community
Work Experiences Programs (CWEP). This is no surprise because the
1988 legislation that established JOBS stipulated that formal education
and training activities should be the main focus. Only four states—Col
orado, Nevada, Ohio and West Virginia—have placed a significant
fraction of their JOBS resources into CWEP. This emphasis on formal
education and training constituted a sharp break from the OBRA-WIN
program approach that immediately preceded JOBS. Under OBRAWIN, a greater emphasis was placed on CWEP-type activities.
Table 5.1 Average Monthly Percentage of JOBS Participants Distributed
by Service Component, Fiscal Year 1992: U.S. Total
____Types of JOBS service_______Percent of total enrolled___
Education
High school
29.3
Post secondary
17.8
Vocational training
7.5
Jobs skill training
11.4
Jobs readiness
5.4
Job development and entry
10.3
Job search
11.3
On-the-job training
0.5
Work supplementation
0.1
CWEP
4.4
Other
1.9
Total*
100.0
Total number of participants3_____________403,653________
SOURCE: Derived from table 10-6, 1994 Green Book, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Ways and Means.
a. The total excludes those who are listed as in "assessment/employment plan." Each component
is shown as a percentage of this adjusted total. Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to
rounding.
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The JOBS legislation also targets specific subgroups of AFDC
recipients—the long-term AFDC recipient and, especially, the teen-age
mother who has not received a high school diploma. Yet a recent GAO
survey (GAO 1993) estimated that only about 24 percent of all AFDC
parents under 20 years of age were being served by JOBS. These
young mothers were almost exclusively enrolled in secondary school
in either a regular degree program or a GED program. Of the teen
mothers served by JOBS, about 25 percent were also receiving some
type of special support service for teen mothers such as "life-skills"
training or prenatal classes. For these few AFDC teen mothers, the
treatment under JOBS was similar to the treatment received under
Project Redirection and the Teen Parent Demonstration Project,
reviewed earlier.
The remaining JOBS participants were drawn from other targeted
groups, such as mothers whose youngest child is within two years of
age 18, and from nontargeted groups who are generally short-term
AFDC recipients.
Overall Coverage and Utilization of JOBS by States

The 1988 JOBS legislation required that certain percentages of nonexempt AFDC recipients participate in JOBS activities if the state was
to continue receiving federal matching funds for JOBS. This require
ment generated a management information system under which the
states reported each year on the percentage of all AFDC recipients who
are nonexempt (i.e., are "mandatory" for participation in JOBS) and
the percent of these mandatory participants who did in fact participate.
Did JOBS lead to large percentages of AFDC mothers being made
mandatory and required to participate in training and other programs?
And has JOBS been more effective than previous work and training
regimes in inducing participation?
The 1988 law, as well as other programs that preceded JOBS
(OBRA-WIN), allowed for exemptions from participation in workeducation-training programs. The most important reason for exemption
has always been the presence of pre-school-age children, either under
age 6 (pre-JOBS) or under age 3 (JOBS). JOBS is more complicated
than pre-JOBS programs with regard to the young child exemption,
however. Under JOBS, a child between ages 3 and 6 can trigger an
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exemption if childcare services are not guaranteed to the mother. On
the other hand, an AFDC mother who is younger than 20 years of age,
is not enrolled in school and does not have a high school diploma must
participate in JOBS, regardless of the age of her child. Further, JOBS
allows states to reduce the minimum age at which a child qualifies a
mother for exemption to 1 year old.
Table 5.2 shows the percentage of AFDC adult recipients who are
nonexempt from JOBS, ("mandatories"), the percentage of these
AFDC mandatories who were participants in JOBS, and the percent of
JOBS participants among all AFDC adult recipients for FY 91, FY 92,
and FY 94, by state and for the entire U.S.
On average, across states, 43 percent of the AFDC adult recipients
are found to be mandatories for JOBS—meaning that slightly less than
60 percent of AFDC adult recipients were exempt from the program. A
60 percent exemption rate is larger than the fraction of AFDC recipient
children who are under 3 years of age (about 25 percent across states)
and even larger than the fraction of children under age 6 (about 40 per
cent). As table 5.3 shows, about 73 percent of all exemptions arise
because of the presence of children below the age cut-off. Thus, almost
all preschool children on AFDC must have been providing exemptions
for their mothers—with other factors, such as having a sick child, pro
viding the remainder of exemptions. Since JOBS does not require
mothers to participate when childcare is lacking, this finding may
reflect limitations on childcare resources, although it might also reflect
a lack of enthusiasm by welfare administrators for enforcing the JOBS
participation obligation.
The large variation across states in these percentages probably
reflects these same factors—variation in the percent of children under 3
and 6, availability of child care resources, and variable enforcement by
welfare administrators.
A comparison of columns 8 and 9 in table 5.2 shows that, although
22 percent of the JOBS mandatories were participating in JOBS activi
ties (in FY 94), these participants account for only 9 percent of all
AFDC recipients. Thus, to increase the overall JOBS participation rate
(the percent of all welfare recipients in JOBS) to a level of 60 or 70
percent would require a very large increase in resources over current
levels—with a large amount needed for child care services

Table 5.2 Percent of AFDC Caseload Mandatory for JOBS, Percent Mandatories Participating in JOBS, and
Percent Caseload Participating in JOBS, FY 1991,1992,1994

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

FY 1991

State
U.S. (total)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

(5)

(6)

(7)

FY 1992

(8)

(9)

FY 1994

% of AFDC
%of
% of AFDC % of AFDC
%of
% of AFDC % of AFDC
%of
% of AFDC
adults
mandatories
adults
mandatories
adults
adults
adults
mandatories
adults
mandatory participating participating mandatory participating participating mandatory participating participating
for JOBS
in JOBS
in JOBS
for JOBS
in JOBS
in JOBS
for JOBS
in JOBS
in JOBS
15
39
43
6
17
7
43
22
9
17
26
4
26
30
8
62
25
15
27
16
22
4
18
4
27
23
6
21
12
3
11
25
3
19
17
3
38
24
24
37
9
9
23
20
5
36
14
5
12
39
5
42
19
8
69
14
70
10
17
12
71
15
11
52
27
61
14
24
15
21
56
12
31
28
41
9
18
7
39
19
7

District of
Columbia

37

9

3

51

12

6

48

10

5

Florida

24

19

5

26

15

4

19

31

6

42

22

9

Georgia

32

10

3

39

12

5

Hawaii

6

9

1

7

10

1

37

15

5

Idaho

20

27

5

21

39

8

25

39

10

Illinois

54

11

6

57

11

6

55

20

11

Indiana

18

7

1

39

6

2

40

23

9

Table 5.2 (continued)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

FY 1991

State
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire

(5)

(6)

(7)

FY 1992

(8)
FY 1994

(9)

17
11
9

%ofAFDC
%of
% of AFDC % of AFDC
%of
% of AFDC % of AFDC
%of
% of AFDC
adults
mandatories
adults
adults
mandatories
adults
adults
mandatories
adults
mandatory participating participating mandatory participating participating mandatory
participating participating
for JOBS
in JOBS
in JOBS
for JOBS
in JOBS
in JOBS
for JOBS
in JOBS
in JOBS
32
10
3
32
12
4
39
16
6
54
6
3
56
20
11
59
36
21
18
23
4
24
20
5
59
20
12
24
9
2
33
13
4
40
23
9
49
7
3
55
9
5
55
23
13
50
6
3
50
10
5
40
18
7
43
39
17
50
32
16
50
17
9
57
12
7
56
17
10
64
21
13
46
8
4
29
16
5
35
19
7
12
3
0.4
20
13
3
48
18
9
24
8
2
29
14
4
38
17
6
58
25
15
90
17
15
52
28
14
38
73
28
41
77
32
45
76
34
21
16
3
28
15
4
37
17
6
34

23

8

40

25

New Jersey

10

41

52

14

41

7

56

14

New Mexico

8

61

35

18

18

6

28

26

7

33

28

4

45

9

3

38

26

10

37

6

46

19

9

14

5

41

20

31

11

36

29

8
10

10

16

29

13

22

44

9

10

57

30

4
17

6

49

19

9

14

9

70

16

11

16

6

26

29

7
29
5

14

New York

43

North Carolina

28

North Dakota

38

Ohio

52

15

8

54

19

Oklahoma

68

45

31

70

32

Oregon

39

20

8

48

21

Pennsylvania

45

10

5

46

13

Rhode Island

56

17

10

63

South Carolina

23

20

5

35

10

South Dakota

29

25

7

34

25

9

50

57

Tennessee

16

11

2

20

20

4

22

24

Texas

41

12

5

46

12

6

33

17

6

Utah

67

43

29

84

35

29

69

51

35

Vermont

55

11

6

51

14

7

50

15

7

Virginia

29

16

5

36

18

6

38

19

7

Washington

27

16

4

36

31

11

36

37

13

West Virginia

60

13

8

52

13

7

48

28

13

Wisconsin

52

53

32

17

41

32

13

39

20

27
52
11
52
31
34
15
44
33
SOURCE: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book: FY 1991, 1993 edition (table 7, pp. 642-644), FY 1992, 19
edition (table 10-8, pp. 357-359, FY 1994, 1996 edition (table 8-9, pp. 425-427).
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Table 5.3 AFDC Adult Recipients Exempt from Work Programs by
Reason for Exemption
Percent distribution
Total
exempt Aged, poor Child
Year___adults
health
underage

Student

Employed

Other

0.5

1.9

16.7

1987

1,980,604

8.4

1991

2,327,525

8.7____72.8_____1.4_____2.9_____14.2

72.5

SOURCE: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients, FY 1991 and FY
1987, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance, Washington,
DC.

Table 5.4 compares the percentage of AFDC recipients who were
mandatory registrants for work and training programs in FY 1986,
1987, and 1992. During 1986 and 1987, the OBRA-WIN program was
in force, and in 1992 JOBS was in operation. As noted, under OBRAWIN any child under age 6 would trigger an exemption, while under
JOBS the exemption age could be 3 if childcare were available and
could be eliminated entirely if the schooling attained by the AFDC
teenage mother were less than a high school degree. In general, since
the exemption requirements are more stringent under JOBS, we would
expect to find a larger percent subject to the mandate under JOBS than
under OBRA-WIN.
The data in table 5.4 show that this is not the case. The mandatory
percentages are about the same under the two regimes. And table 5.3
shows that the reasons for being nonmandatory (exempt from worktraining programs) were very similar under JOBS and OBRA-WIN.
Clearly, the presence of a young, and especially a pre-school-age, child
has always been a very important barrier to participation in education
and training programs. Moreover, the data in table 5.4 suggest that this
problem may be as strong as ever in spite of the pressures to promote
employability activities surrounding the JOBS program. However, the
small increase in the percent participating in JOBS activities in FY 94
suggests some improvement may have been made under JOBS. Again,
we cannot be sure if the low mandatory participation rates reflect lack
of child care resources or a resistant attitude by administrators.
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Table 5.4 Percent of Adult AFDC Recipients who were Mandatory
Registrants for Work and Training Programs, by State, Fiscal
Years 1986,1987,1992
FY 1986

FY 1987

FY 1992

Alabama

23

19

26

Alaska

18

16

22

Arizona

22

23

25

Arkansas

41

55

37

California

30

30

39

Colorado
Connecticut

29

28

36

36

70
61

Delaware

30

29

41

District of Columbia

27

29

51

Florida

23

71

26

Georgia

26

25

39

Hawaii

17

14

7

Idaho

30

30

21

Illinois

32

32

57

Indiana

39

39

Iowa

24

53
26

Kansas

24

23

56

Kentucky

24

60

24

Louisiana

15

33

Maine

23

8
26

Maryland

31

27

50

Massachusetts

43

47

50

Michigan

91

91

56

Minnesota

23

26

29

Mississippi

10

20

Missouri

16

5
15

Montana

27

28

90

State

32

55

29
(continued)
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Table 5.4 (continued)
FY 1986

FY 1987

FY 1992

Nebraska

97

97

41

Nevada

18

20

28

New Hampshire

27

25

40

New Jersey

41

41

56

New Mexico

17

19

28

New York

32

30

45

North Carolina

38

37

38

North Dakota

42

41

37

Ohio

32

30

54

Oklahoma

92

93

70

Oregon
Pennsylvania

40

35

97

96

48
46

36

63

- South Carolina

33
22

18

35

South Dakota

35

34

34

Tennessee

46

51

20

Texas

30

46

Utah

21

39
19

Vermont

21

44

51

Virginia

36

32

36

Washington

27

28

36

West Virginia

37

40

52

Wisconsin

28

31

53

Wyoming

39

35

34

U.S. Total

39

40

43

State

Rhode Island

84

SOURCE: Columns (1) and (2) are from Characteristics and Financial Circumstances ofAFDC
Recipients, FY86 and FY87, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family
Assistance. Column (3) is from 1994 Green Book, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Ways and Means.
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Finally, table 5.5 shows the percentage of female AFDC participants
who were employed (either full time or part time) at the end of the fis
cal years 1987 and 1991.2 Again, there is little sign that the impact of
JOBS on the employ ability and work incentives of AFDC recipients is
any greater than that of earlier programs with similar goals. However,
because economic conditions were less favorable in 1991 than in 1987,
it is possible that JOBS has improved utilization of training-employ
ment activities.

Program Experiments by States under the JOBS Waiver Program
Like the OBRA-WIN program before it, the JOBS program has
allowed individual states to make experimental modifications and
changes in their individual state AFDC programs. Some states
appeared quite eager to experiment with program changes in order to
improve their overall AFDC programs. By early 1996, 44 states were
involved in special experimental changes that required waivers from
the federal government.3
Our review is in two parts. The first part covers two types of experi
ments that, although aimed at getting people to leave welfare, may
have the unintended effect of providing people with incentives to join
the rolls. The experiments in the second group do not have this type of
side effect.
Experiments with Marginal Work Incentives and with the
AFDC- UP Program

Thirty of the forty-four states operating under program waivers have
been experimenting with some form of marginal work incentive provi
sion that is more generous than the provisions contained in the federal
rules.4 In addition, thirty-three states have been experimenting with
eliminating the work experience rule for the eligibility of a two-parent
family for the AFDC-UP part of the AFDC program.
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Table 5.5 Percent of Female AFDC Recipients Who Were Employed
(either Part Time or Full Time), Pre-JOBS (1987) and PostJOBS (1991), by State of Residence
June 1987

June 1991

Alabama

4.2

3.0

Alaska

6.3

10.7

Arizona

4.9

5.1

Arkansas

5.6

5.5

California

5.3

6.3

Colorado

8.2

6.0

Connecticut

6.7

5.3

Delaware

5.8

8.7

District of Columbia

4.8

1.8

Florida

7.5

6.1

Georgia

2.5

5.5

Hawaii

5.9

13.8

Idaho

13.9

Illinois

7.0
2.9

Indiana

10.3

8.5

Iowa

15.8

Kansas

10.2

15.8
12.6

Kentucky

3.7

11.1

Louisiana

0.7

2.6

Maine

7.9

15.2

Maryland

3.3

3.7

Massachusetts

7.4

4.5

Michigan

11.7

Minnesota

9.3
14.4

11.4

Mississippi

4.1

12.1

Missouri

6.5

6.2

Montana

12.3

12.1

State

4.0
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June 1987

June 1991

Nebraska

15.9

15.6

Nevada

4.7

2.5

New Hampshire

9.5

5.5

New Jersey

2.9

2.5

New Mexico

5.2

7.2

New York

4.0

2.9

North Carolina

3.9

13.0

North Dakota

17.6

16.0

Ohio

3.7

5.2

Oklahoma

6.7

5.8

Oregon

14.0

10.0

Pennsylvania

3.6

2.8

Rhode Island

8.3

3.9

South Carolina

8.2

11.2

South Dakota

15.6

12.4

Tennessee

6.7

9.2

Texas

3.2

4.1

Utah

20.4

20.0

Vermont

11.3

8.9

Virginia

7.6

4.8

Washington

7.9

8.4

West Virginia

4.7

1.9

Wisconsin

15.9

16.1

Wyoming

7.4

26.1

Guam

0.6

2.1

Puerto Rico

0.3

0.1

Virgin Islands

2.5

3.0

U.S. Total

5.8

6.4

State

SOURCE: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances ofAFDC Recipients, FY 1991 and FY
1987, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance, Washington,
D.C.
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Marginal Work Incentives
In 1995, except for $190 a month that could be deducted for work
and childcare expenses and $30 a month that was "disregarded," a
working AFDC mother's earnings were all subtracted from her AFDC
benefit amount. Moreover, the $30 monthly income disregard was only
allowed during the mother's first year on the program. The AFDC
amount was then reduced by all of the recipient's remaining net earn
ings—sometimes called a "100 percent implicit tax on net earnings."
The various experimental disregard programs all increased the
amount of net earnings that could be disregarded. For example, in Cal
ifornia, the first $30 plus 33 percent of the remaining net earnings have
been disregarded, with no time limit on the disregard. In Michigan, the
disregard has been $200 a month plus 20 percent of the remaining net
earnings.
These disregards were aimed at providing existing welfare recipi
ents with a monetary incentive to work—that is, the recipients could
add to their total income by working because their net earnings would
not be fully deducted from their AFDC benefit amount. On the other
hand, even though these disregards may have increased work effort
among AFDC recipients, there is no empirical evidence over the his
tory of their use (1967-1981) and nonuse (1982-present) to suggest that
they also got recipients to leave the program entirely. This is not really
surprising, given the fact that earnings disregards by themselves do not
give a recipient a pecuniary incentive to leave the program. However,
the earnings disregards do provide an incentive to work while on wel
fare and to combine some level of earnings with some reduced benefit
amount.
The way these effects are expected to operate is illustrated in chart
5.1. Note that the disregard expands the recipient's potential income
for a given number of hours worked while on welfare. Supporters of
earnings disregards argue that recipients will be prompted to leave the
welfare program as their earnings in the private sector grow due to
increased work experience. They claim that the disregard operates by
first inducing the recipient to try working while still receiving welfare
benefits, and then motivating the recipient to get on-the-job training to
raise her earnings capacity to a level that makes leaving welfare attrac
tive financially. This process can move a recipient off the program, but
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only if the slope of her off-program budget line, which equals her wage
rate, as shown in chart 5.1, does in fact pivot (at point L0) to the right
by a significant amount.
Chart 5.1 Analysis of the Effect of Earnings Disregards on the Incentive
to Come On and to Leave Welfare
Money income
($)

M
Welfare
benefit <
amount

Leisure time
NOTE: Without an earnings disregard the individual©s budget line is LoTVX. With an
earnings disregard the budget line becomes L^TZX.

What proponents of disregards have usually overlooked is that in
addition to stimulating work among women on welfare—a good
effect—they can also provide a pecuniary incentive for women not on
welfare to come into the program. This can also be illustrated in chart
5.1. In the absence of a disregard, the budget line confronting a poten
tial welfare program entrant (L0TVX) is such that she would not come
on the program because she is on her budget line between points V and
X. Her earnings rate in the private sector and her preferences between
money income and leisure are such that the welfare benefit amount
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itself (L0T) is not enough for her to go into the program. However,
when a positive disregard rate is introduced to the picture, her budget
line on welfare pivots up to (L0TZX) and she might now enter the pro
gram and reduce her hours of work—locating somewhere on the seg
ment TZ. Now the combination of reduced earnings and partial welfare
benefits is more attractive than her income off welfare.
There is some empirical evidence on the caseload-increasing effects
of earnings disregards.5 For example, we saw previously that the Fam
ily Independence Plan (FIP) program contained a generous earnings
disregard for AFDC women in the treatment group and that the evalua
tion of FIP reported caseload increases. It is not clear how earnings dis
regards would interact with strict time limits under the new welfare
legislature. The strict time limit gives recipients the incentive to
become job-ready, and whether they need the extra incentives of the
disregard is not obvious. As noted for training programs, state welfare
administrators should carefully monitor the possible caseload effects of
marginal disregard increases.
AFDC- UP Program
The AFDC-UP Program was an optional program for states up to
1990. After that, it was mandatory for every state to provide a program
for families with dependent children in which both parents were
present but neither can locate a job. The federal rules limited participa
tion in AFDC-UP to those families in which at least one of the parents
had significant work experience in the four years preceding application
for AFDC-UP. More specifically, parents had to have worked in six
quarters out of the twelve quarters that preceded their time of applica
tion for AFDC-UP. This work-experience requirement is similar to that
used by the unemployment insurance (UI) program. In addition the
AFDC-UP program required that a spouse who goes back to work does
not work more than 100 hours a month. Working more than 100 hours,
even if earnings are still low enough for eligibility, would lead to loss
of eligibility.
The reason for the work-experience requirement was to restrict the
benefits of the program to those who have demonstrated a serious
attachment to the labor force. The requirement excluded unemployed
families who had just entered the labor force until they had demon
strated the requisite attachment by accumulating work experience.
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States that have experimented with dropping the work-experience
requirement for their AFDC-UP program were hoping that it would
keep young couples together who otherwise would split up in order to
obtain AFDC benefits. A young couple with a dependent child but no
job or work experience could come into the AFDC-UP program as an
intact family in those states with this experiment in place (Alabama,
Florida, Michigan, Illinois, and Vermont).
A potential problem with this approach was similar to that suggested
for the earnings disregard—that is, some young, unemployed married
couples who would not have divorced or separated to go on welfare
would have an incentive to participate in the AFDC-UP program.
Young couples with limited skills and little work experience generally
start out with low-paying jobs and may have a hard time finding and
deciding among job options. With the work-experience requirement
waived, some of them may have been tempted to delay this stressful
process by taking advantage of AFDC-UP. The situation is similar for
the 100-hour rule. Its purpose was to discourage couples from using
AFDC benefits to finance their marriage by sharply limiting the
amount of income they could obtain while collecting AFDC-UP bene
fits. Again, some married couples who would not have split up to col
lect AFDC benefits with the 100-hour rule would have been tempted to
go on AFDC when it was lifted in the experiment.
Other Experiments

Most of the remaining state experiments under the JOBS waiver
program fall into three groups: time-limit experiments, experiments
that limited the additional benefits that could be obtained when a
child is born after the family was on the program, and various rules
and sanctions relating to participation in the JOBS education and
training program activities. There are other types of experiments with
childcare provisions, responsibilities of grandparents and step-par
ents, and initiatives related to children and teen parents, which we do
not comment on.
Two-Year Limits
Thirteen states, including Florida, Iowa, Vermont, and Wisconsin,
have set up experiments under which some recipients in some locations
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in the state were told that they can only collect benefits for a specific
and limited period of time.
Florida's experiment was conducted in only two counties in the
state. The plan limited recipients to no more than 24 months of AFDC
benefits in any 60-month period or more than 36 months of benefits in
any 72-month period. The particular time-limit group a recipient was
assigned to depended on family characteristics. The plan allowed fami
lies who lost AFDC benefits under the experiment to keep their Medicaid eligibility. Moreover, there was no provision requiring a specified
minimum time to elapse between the exhaustion of benefit payments
and renewed welfare eligibility. Thus, immediately after 60 months or
72 months, the family would be eligible for 24 or 36 more weeks of
benefits.
Iowa's plan, which was put in force statewide, did not mention a
specific time limit. The plan simply states that "once JOBS participants
have reached the end of a mutually agreed upon time frame for achiev
ing self-sufficiency, benefits are terminated (with a possible extension
for good cause)."
Vermont's time-limit experiment, also enforced statewide since July
1994, required that after 30 months of AFDC, a family head must
obtain his/her own job or participate in subsidized community service
employment.
Wisconsin's experiment operated in two counties and was similar to
Florida's—i.e., benefits could be collected for up to 24 months within a
48-month period. However, unlike Florida, Wisconsin required a mini
mum time period of 36 months to elapse between the collection of the
last AFDC monthly payment and the receipt of additional AFDC bene
fits. On the other hand, both the Florida and Wisconsin time-limit
experiments allowed recipients to return to welfare after some prede
termined period had elapsed.
Additional Children and Benefits
Twenty states have had some form of limit on how much benefits
would increase when an AFDC family had an additional child that was
conceived while the parents were on welfare. Georgia, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin, for example, have had experimental programs that limit the
amount of cash AFDC benefits a family could obtain when the family
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has another child while already on the program. The food stamp allot
ment did increase for the additional child, however.
Both Georgia and New Jersey allowed no increase in the AFDC cash
benefit for an additional child, and both states were explicit in saying
that what made the family ineligible for a benefit increase was the con
ception of the additional child after the family had gone on AFDC.
Wisconsin allowed the family one-half of the usual per child cash
allowance for the "second child born" and nothing for the third and
additional children born. Wisconsin's program statement did not men
tion whether time of conception or birth governed this determination.
Utilization of JOBS Services
States have experimented with ways to increase the utilization of
their JOBS program's educational and training services. One approach
has been to extend permission for use of the services to the noncusto
dial parent of an AFDC child— usually the father. Another has been to
specify that only mothers with very young children (e.g., less than six
months) can be excused from participating in JOBS activities.
Some states also require AFDC children age 14 or older to partici
pate in JOBS, and some states reserve the right to cut off benefits if
recipients, who are mandatory for JOBS, fail to participate.

Summary
Our review suggests that the JOBS legislative-administrative appa
ratus made, at best, only marginal improvement over past regimes in
utilizing work and training programs to reduce the welfare caseload.
The AFDC program has been, for all practical purposes, dominated
administratively by the individual state welfare administrators. Thus it
remains to be seen whether the efforts of the federal government to
mandate participation under the new welfare program will produce any
results unless the states really believe that education and training will
greatly reduce welfare caseloads.
The wide range of experiments launched by the states under the
JOBS waiver provisions, however, is a very hopeful sign. It suggests
that giving more discretion to the states might lead to innovative
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approaches to the problem of reducing welfare caseloads and easing
the transition to work. However, as noted, it is too early to assess the
results of the experiments started in the early 1990s. Since this was a
period that included a recession and then a full-scale recovery, it will
be difficult to separate out the effects of the waiver experiments on the
AFDC caseload from the effects of the changes in the economy.
NOTES
1. The study by Greenberg and Wiseman (1992) presents an interesting analysis of how the
OBRA administrative framework influenced the JOBS program.
2. These figures refer to work activities that are reported to the program. There is some evi
dence that AFDC recipients underreported their earnings.
3. Periodic summaries of state waivers are prepared by the American Public Welfare Associa
tion and by the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP).
4. The amount of coverage of any waiver program within a state varies from total coverage to
coverages of only a small part of the state's AFDC program.
5. See chapters 2 and 4.

CHAPTER

Summary and Concluding Comments
In recent years there has been growing concern that the AFDC pro
gram has fostered welfare dependency and encouraged the formation
of female-headed families. Such concerns have spurred widespread
support for legislation that would significantly restrict eligibility for
benefits and in other ways reduce the attractiveness of the program.
The new law that replaces AFDC makes many such changes, including
the imposition of a five-year lifetime limit on receipt of welfare and
stiffer work requirements during periods of welfare receipt. Signifi
cantly, the law also gives the states substantially more power to deter
mine eligibility, benefit structure, and program provisions than was the
case under AFDC.
This study presented data and analysis bearing on three key aspects
of welfare participation that the states will have to consider as they
determine the best way to implement the new welfare legislation. One
is the effect of financial incentives in the welfare benefit system on
welfare participation. The second involves the patterns of welfare use
and the work skills and other characteristics of short- and long-term
welfare recipients. The third is the effectiveness of the many work and
training programs for welfare participants that have been tried over the
past twenty-five years.

The Effect of Financial Incentives
The new law will reduce the value of going on welfare in several
ways. The imposition of a five-year time limit significantly reduces the
potential benefit that could be accumulated over a life time. A manda
tory work requirement after two years in the program imposes costs on
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recipients who will lose free time. Block grants could lead states to
provide lower benefits than would otherwise be the case.
An important question then is how individuals will respond to the
reduced income stream offered by welfare. Will the changed incentives
induce current recipients to leave welfare, through work or marriage,
sooner than was the case in the old AFDC program? Will the new pro
visions discourage entry into welfare in the first place and reverse the
trend of increasing formation of female-headed families, particularly
through out-of-wedlock childbearing? Or will the primary effect of
these changes be to increase poverty with little or no change in the
work or marital behavior of recipients forced to leave the program, or
in the motivation of young women to take steps to avoid welfare
dependency?
Research cannot give definitive answers to these questions. How
ever, the analysis in chapter 2 suggests that individuals are responsive
to changes in the level of benefits provided by the welfare system. The
growth in the welfare caseload since the mid 1960s is consistent with
the growth in the value of the total benefit package (including the
AFDC cash benefit plus Food Stamps and Medicaid) which was 60
percent higher in 1994, after adjusting for inflation, than the value of
benefits in 1964 when benefits were largely confined to the AFDC cash
component alone. The benefit-restricting changes incorporated in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) also appear to
have reduced the caseload. With respect to the effects of welfare on the
increase in female-headed families, recent research (cited in chapter 2)
suggests that welfare has had a negative effect on marriage and a posi
tive effect on out-of-wedlock childbearing, although the importance of
these effects is variable across studies. Because the new legislation will
reduce the value of going on welfare, we anticipate that it will induce
reduction in the welfare caseload. The impact may be greater in the
long run as attitudes of future cohorts of young women may be influ
enced by the legislation, causing some decline in out-of-wedlock childbearing and increases in marriage and work.
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Characteristics of the Welfare Population
The characteristics and behavior patterns of the current welfare pop
ulation are bound to influence the practical implementation of welfare
reform by the states. Given a 5-year time limit it becomes important to
know the number who have exceeded the limit under AFDC and to be
able to determine, based on skills and other characteristics, which
recipients are most likely to encounter problems.
As shown in chapter 3, which analyzes the welfare usage of a
national sample of young women followed over a thirteen-year period,
there is considerable diversity in recipient behavior. Counting all epi
sodes on welfare over the thirteen years, we find that more than 40 per
cent of mothers who ever go on welfare eventually accumulate more
than five years on the program. But another group seems to stay on
welfare for relatively short periods—about 30 percent of those who
went on welfare accumulated less than two years on the program (17
percent less than one year).
Women who bear their first child out of wedlock and while a teen
ager have been the subgroup most likely to go on welfare, and to accu
mulate the longest tenure on AFDC. Our estimates show that among a
cohort of teenage unwed mothers, half have gone on welfare within the
first two years of their first birth and eventually more than 80 percent
have participated. Of those who have gone on welfare, half have stayed
for more than five years, and 35 percent for more than seven years.
This subgroup of the AFDC recipient population made up more than
half of the AFDC caseload in 1996. Since teen unwed mothers on wel
fare have limited schooling and low cognitive achievement to begin
with (in part a consequence of their early childbearing) and also
acquire little work experience while on welfare, they are likely to expe
rience difficulties supporting themselves and their children with a pri
vate sector job. They are the most likely group to come up against a
five-year time limit and therefore will present the greatest problems for
states seeking to move recipients into jobs.
There is a bright spot in this discouraging picture of teenage unwed
mothers who go on welfare. A surprising percentage (about half) have
left welfare for at least two years when observed about a decade after
their first child's birth. Most work, but marriage appears to be the most
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effective way to attain a higher income. Those who married (53 per
cent) had a family income of $30,000 (1989 dollars), about threefourths the income of women who bore their first child after marriage
and never went on welfare. In contrast, those who left welfare but did
not marry had an average total income of only $14,700.
Nonetheless, welfare participation, regardless of marital status or
age at first birth, has a detrimental effect on the level of earnings attain
able. Women who leave welfare have high rates of work participation,
almost equaling those of women with children who have never been on
welfare, but the earnings former welfare mothers can command remain
substantially lower than those of other women. Although their earnings
rise as they accumulate work experience, their low skills and lost years
of work while on welfare perpetuate an earnings gap that is likely to be
difficult to close.

The Effectiveness of Welfare-to-work Programs
Chapter 4 addresses the question: how effective have been alterna
tive types of programs in raising AFDC women's earnings and in
reducing caseloads? Evidence is presented from research on three
genres of programs: employment, education, and training for adult
women with school-age children; education and other services for
teenage mothers who were new AFDC recipients; and workfare.
Results from the JOBS program are discussed in chapter 5.
One important caveat to this review is that the findings refer to pro
grams implemented in an environment in which there was no limit on
the time a women could remain on welfare. The conclusions about the
programs' effectiveness may not necessarily apply to programs oper
ated under an environment of welfare reform with a five-year lifetime
limit.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that any of the large number of
education, employment, and training programs that have been offered
or mandated for AFDC recipients since 1967 has had a significant
impact on the duration of time spent on welfare. Although some pro
grams have had positive effects on the employment and earnings of
recipients, these effects have been too small and transitory to move sig-
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nificant numbers of recipients off welfare completely. These discourag
ing results apply to adult recipients as well as to young women
enrolled in special programs for teenage AFDC mothers. Whether
these programs would be more effective if combined with a mandatory
welfare time-limit remains a question that cannot be answered with
currently available data.
Workfare, although much discussed, has seldom been tried for sin
gle mothers on AFDC. Workfare is a program in which welfare recipi
ents are mandated to perform an assigned job for a specified number of
hours per week in return for welfare benefits. The empirical evidence
on its effects is scanty, although one evaluation of such a program tried
in Ohio did provide some evidence that it reduced the AFDC caseload.
On theoretical grounds at least (see chapter 4), workfare constitutes a
promising tool to be tried, particularly for women with school-aged
children. On philosophical grounds, the idea of working for one's ben
efit may also help instill appropriate work attitudes among recipients.
In 1994, under the JOBS program, only 9 percent of all adult AFDC
recipients were enrolled in a training program. The degree to which
AFDC program administrators targeted AFDC recipients for training
by assigning them mandatory status was no greater under JOBS than it
was during the pre-JOBS era in the late 1980s. Since the new welfare
legislation requires an increase in work activity participation to 25 per
cent of the adult caseload (rising to 50 percent), a large increase in
resources could be required over current levels, especially for child
care services. Such an expansion may not be feasible, at least in a short
time period.

Prevention Versus Rehabilitation
It has proven to be extraordinarily difficult for any government pro
gram to transform the subgroup of recipients with multiple problems
into workers who can earn a high enough income to support a family
on their own and compete with the benefit offered to welfare recipients.
Changes in incentives may improve the success rate of some traditional
programs. But it is likely that a core group will continue to be difficult
to reach.
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For this core group it may be more fruitful for states to focus their
efforts on measures aimed at preventing girls from starting on the path
to welfare dependence in the first place. Such efforts could include nar
rowly targeted programs, such as teen pregnancy prevention programs
and targeted employment programs. Unfortunately, the results of many
such programs have not been very encouraging. 1 One of the exceptions
is the JOB START program which while a training program appears to
have reduced the probability of a first pregnancy and subsequent
AFDC participation among teenage girls.
The fact of the matter, however, is that it has proven difficult for nar
rowly focused, short duration programs, such as the teen pregnancy
prevention programs, to overcome the handicaps that often arise from
growing up in a disadvantaged family and neighborhood. 2 Because of
these larger conditioning factors it is important to turn to more funda
mental institutions in our society to improve the upward mobility of
disadvantaged groups.
School may be the institution best suited for addressing the prob
lems underlying the skill deficiencies and attitudinal problems associ
ated with welfare dependency. It is true that the performance of our
schools, particularly those in poor and troubled neighborhoods, has
been a long standing concern. In many cities, however, efforts are
underway to provide new kinds of schooling opportunities for disad
vantaged children, including special schools within the public school
system, charter schools, publicly funded vouchers and privately funded
scholarships. The ability to choose schooling alternatives, and features
of the alternatives themselves, may encourage parents to become more
involved in their children's development, a factor that is often lacking.
Moreover, the declining accessibility of welfare may give parents
and their teenage children new incentives to utilize the schools if they
are perceived as a way to improve incomes off welfare. It is hoped that
the outcome of these efforts will be not only to raise academic perfor
mance but also to impart a positive influence on social attitudes and
aspirations. Improvements in schooling opportunities, therefore, may
in the long run help forestall the early childbearing and other behavior
that often leads to future welfare dependence.
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NOTES
1. See the review article on adolescent pregnancy prevention program by Moore et al. (1995).
2. Hill and O'Neill (1993) find a strong association between family and neighborhood charac
teristics while growing up and the likelihood of an out-of-wedlock birth and long-term welfare
dependence.

Appendix A
Current Population Survey (CPS) and Caseload Measures
of the Size of the AFDC Caseload
As illustrated in table A-l, major data sources do not agree on the overall
number of AFDC families. The Current Population Survey (CPS) counts fewer
families on welfare each year than the caseload data. Moreover, the difference
between the AFDC BASIC caseload (total recipient units minus unemployed
parent cases) and the CPS count of female-headed AFDC families widened be
tween 1987 and 1992 when the CPS shows only two-thirds as many families
as the caseload data.
Part of the discrepancy between the CPS and caseload measures arises be
cause of differences in definition. The basic caseload data include a wider array
of family types than the CPS series, which can be more cleanly restricted to fe
male-headed families with children (no spouse present in the household). The
AFDC caseload data, for example, contain cases without an adult recipient (al
though a caretaker adult is presumably present) and these no adult cases in
creased by 346,000 between 1987 and 1992—a 74 percent increase (column 3
of table A-l). 1 In 1992, no adult units accounted for close to half of the differ
ence between the CPS and caseload measures of recipient families.
Insight into factors that might be responsible for the remaining CPS undercount is provided in a special study reported by Goudreau, Oberheu and Denton (1984) in which respondents to a follow-up survey conducted by the
Census Bureau were matched with AFDC caseload records in several states.
The study indicates that nonreporting of AFDC receipt to the Census Bureau
was three times higher for those who were shown to have received benefits for
a portion of the year compared to those receiving benefits throughout the peri
od. A higher level of welfare nonreporting was also found for workers com
pared to nonworkers, and for married compared to nonmarried individuals. In
all, it appears that the CPS may not seriously underreport the number of recip
ients who would be the primary targets for employment and training programs
under welfare reform, since it is the transitory, short-term participants who are
most likely to be missed by the CPS surveys.
We have also compared the size of the welfare population as measured by
the CPS with that measured by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), which is a very detailed survey with responses of relatively high qual
ity and accuracy. Tables A-2 and A-3 show the results of this comparison. In
table A-2, women ages 21-28 in 1986 are drawn from the CPS sample to cor
respond with the age range available in the NLSY cohort. (Table A-3 does the
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same for 1990 when the NLSY cohort was ages 25-32.) The female population
counted by the CPS is larger than the NLSY population because the latter is a
fixed cohort that can only diminish in size over time, while the CPS reflects a
population expanded by immigrants who entered the country in large numbers
during the 1980s, particularly in the age groups shown.
Despite differences in the construction of the two surveys, which can influ
ence the identification of mother-child families, the two surveys depict approx
imately the same patterns for the cohorts examined.2 The number of
nonmarried mothers receiving welfare was about 940,000 in 1989 in the age
group 25-32 years of age. This is a slightly lower number of recipients than was
observed for this cohort in 1985 when they were ages 21-28; but since many
more women became mothers over the four-year period these numbers also re
flect a substantial decline in the rate of AFDC participation among single
mothers as age increases. As women move into their late twenties and early
thirties, a larger proportion of nonmarried mothers are divorced or separated
and these women have considerably lower rates of welfare participation than
women who bore their children out-of-wedlock.
It should be noted that the CPS measure of recipients is larger when receipt
of other welfare benefits is counted as AFDC benefits. This more inclusive
measure is likely to be more nearly the correct one. According to Goudreau,
Oberheu and Vaughn (1984), a portion of the CPS undercount of welfare re
ceipt is attributable to failure of the respondent to identify welfare benefits as
AFDC when in fact that is what they are. We therefore have used the more in
clusive definition in tables based on CPS data.

NOTES
1. As discussed in chapter 3, the passage of IRCA is believed to have made it easier for for
merly illegal aliens to claim AFDC benefits for their children, although they themselves were
given a five-year waiting period to qualify.
2. The CPS samples households, while the NLSY samples individuals. Until recently the CPS
did not provide adequate information to correctly identify nonmarried mothers, if these mothers
were heads of subfamilies rather than heads of primary families.

Table A.I Comparison of CPS and Caseload Estimates of Single-Parent Families on AFDC, 1987-1992
(population in thousands)
AFDC caseload data

CPS data

Female-headed
families on
AFDC

BASIC
caseload, all
families minus
unemployed
fathers

(1)

(2)

1987

2,578

3,548

(3)
361

1988

2,542

3,538

359

3,179

3,045

3,319

1989

2,373

3,578

407

3,178

3,076

3,285

1990

2,712

3,770

455

3,315

3,198

3,437

1991

2,938

4,107

558

3,549

3,483

3,712

1992

3,003

4,447

707

3,740

3,691

3,931

1987-92

16.5

24.3

73.7

17.4

21.3

17.6

1989-92

26.5

25.3

95.8

17.7

20.0

19.7

Year

Units with
"no adult"
recipients

BASIC minus Families with
Total female
one adult
"no adult" units
adult recipients
recipient
(2-3)
(6)
(5)
(4)
3,344
3,044
3,187

Percentage increase

COURCE: CPS data are from public use tapes of the Current Population Survey of March of the following year; AFDC caseload data are from the Office
of Family Assistance, U.S. Department of Health and human Services.
NOTE: CPS data refer to the calendar year and caseload data to the fiscal year.

Table A.2 Comparison of AFDC Recipients in 1985 NLSY and CPS (Women Ages 21-28 in 1986)
Women with children

AFDC recipients

Recipients of AFDC and
other welfare

All women
(OOOs)

(OOOs)

Married

7,776

5,239

67.4

229

4.4

NA

Never married

6,424

1,165

18.1

576

49.4

NA

Other nonmarried

1,869

1,157

61.9

380

32.8

NA

Total nonmarried

8,293

2,322

28.0

956

41.2

NA

Married

8,352

5,478

65.6

173

3.2

221

4.0

Never married

6,954

1,054

15.2

565

53.6

619

58.7

Other nonmarried

1,712

1,060

61.8

361

34.1

378

35.7

Total nonmarried

8,669

2,114

24.4

926

43.8

997

47.2

Percent of all
women

(OOOs)

Percent of
mothers

(OOOs)

Percent of
mothers

NLSY, 1985

CPS, 1985

SOURCE: CPS data, see table A.I; NLSY data, NLSY microfiles.

Table A.3 Comparison of AFDC Recipients in 1989 NLSY and CPS (Women Ages 25-32 in 1990)
Women with children

AFDC recipients

Recipients of AFDC and
other welfare

All women
(OOOs)

(OOOs)

Married

9,505

7,184

75.6

178

2.5

NA

Never married

3,780

1,039

27.5

443

42.6

NA

Other nonmarried

2,653

1,835

69.2

498

27.1

NA

Total nonmarried

6,433

2,874

44.7

941

32.7

NA

10,412

7,768

74.6

167

2.1

195

2.5

Never married

4,516

1,054

23.3

462

43.8

475

45.1

Other nonmarried

2,452

1,668

68.0

444

26.6

469

28.1

Total nonmarried

6,968

2,722

39.1

906

33.3

944

34.7

Percent of all
women

(OOOs)

Percent of
mothers

(OOOs)

Percent of
mothers

NLSY, 1989

CPS, 1985
Married

SOURCE: CPS data, see table A.I; NLSY data, NLSY microfiles.

Appendix B
Table B.I Characteristics, Skills and Work Experience
of 22-29-Year-Old Women on AFDC in 1987, by Years
on Welfare Since 1978 (NLSY)
All women On AFDC
2 years
on AFDC
in 1987
or less

On AFDC On AFDC
more than 4 years or
more
2 years

Percent Black

41.1

31.2

46.9

52.1

Percent Hispanic
Percent White

10.5

7.3

10.9

12.1

48.4

61.5

42.2

35.8

Percent teen at first
birth

56.6

38.5

65.5

73.6

Percent out-of-wedlock
first birth

61.6

40.3

70.6

75.9

Percent southern

24.9

27.0

23.8

22.7

in year entered AFDC

1.39

1.55

1.31

1.32

in 1988

2.12

1.85

2.26

2.36

47.5

22.7

52.7

57:5

32.9

18.6

38.0

50.1

AFQT percentile
(mean)

27.1

34.0

24.5

22.6

Percent went on AFDC
within 2 years of first
birth

45.5

29.8

57.4

59.6

Percent worked before
AFDC

75.2

95.5

73.9

65.6

Weeks worked by
working women before
going on AFDC

120

179

75.0

59.8

Number of children:

Percent high school
dropout:
in year went on AFDC
in 1988

(continued)

119

120

Table B.I (continued)
All women On AFDC
2 years
on AFDC
or less
in 1987

On AFDC On AFDC
more than 4 years or
more
2 years

Total months on AFDC
(mean)

48.1

Sample size

570

134

392

291

1,050

328

723

506

Weighted population
(thousands)
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